essay on ethics of animal testing in scientific research

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• Published: 29 September 2004

Use of animals in experimental research: an ethical dilemma?

• V Baumans 1 , 2  

Gene Therapy volume  11 ,  pages S64–S66 ( 2004 ) Cite this article

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Mankind has been using animals already for a long time for food, for transport and as companion. The use of animals in experimental research parallels the development of medicine, which had its roots in ancient Greece (Aristotle, Hippocrate). With the Cartesian philosophy in the 17th century, experiments on animals could be performed without great moral problems. The discovery of anaesthetics and Darwin's publication on the Origin of Species, defending the biological similarities between man and animal, contributed to the increase of animal experimentation. The increasing demand for high standard animal models together with a critical view on the use of animals led to the development of Laboratory Animal Science in the 1950s with Russell and Burch's three R's of Replacement, Reduction and Refinement as guiding principles, a field that can be defined as a multidisciplinary branch of science, contributing to the quality of animal experiments and to the welfare of laboratory animals. The increased interest in and concern about animal welfare issues led to legislative regulations in many countries and the establishment of animal ethics committees.

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3R measures in facilities for the production of genetically modified rodents

Van Zutphen LFM . History of animal use. In: Van Zutphen LFM, Baumans V, Beynen AC (eds). Principles of Laboratory Animal Science . Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2001, pp 2–5.

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Dennis Jr MB . Welfare issues of genetically modified animals. ILAR J 2002; 43 : 100–109.

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Russell WMS, Burch RL . The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique . Methuen: London, 1959, Reprinted by UFAW, 1992: 8 Hamilton Close, South Mimms, Potters Bar, Herts EN6 3QD England.

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Baumans, V. Use of animals in experimental research: an ethical dilemma?. Gene Ther 11 (Suppl 1), S64–S66 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.gt.3302371

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Published : 29 September 2004

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Article Contents

Introduction, animal welfare, human-animal bonds, mentoring and habituation, translational value and intellectual virtue.

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Virtue Ethics and Laboratory Animal Research

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Rebecca L Walker, Virtue Ethics and Laboratory Animal Research, ILAR Journal , Volume 60, Issue 3, 2019, Pages 415–423, https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilaa015

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This article appeals to virtue ethics to help guide laboratory animal research by considering the role of character and flourishing in these practices. Philosophical approaches to animal research ethics have typically focused on animal rights or on the promotion of welfare for all affected, while animal research itself has been guided in its practice by the 3Rs (reduction, refinement, replacement). These different approaches have sometimes led to an impasse in debates over animal research where the philosophical approaches are focused on whether or when animal studies are justifiable, while the 3Rs assume a general justification for animal work but aim to reduce harm to sentient animals and increase their welfare in laboratory spaces. Missing in this exchange is a moral framework that neither assumes nor rejects the justifiability of animal research and focuses instead on the habits and structures of that work. I shall propose a place for virtue ethics in laboratory animal research by considering examples of relevant character traits, the moral significance of human-animal bonds, mentorship in the laboratory, and the importance of animals flourishing beyond mere welfare.

Does a researcher or laboratory technician who develops relationships with her animal subjects owe them a greater duty of care than one who does not? What is the moral significance of the positive or negative psychological effects on the researcher of doing animal research? Can, or should, a rhesus macaque live a good life when housed in a research facility? What about a genetically modified mouse? Questions such as these are of critical importance for a virtue ethical assessment of laboratory animal research practices. Yet similar questions are rarely addressed by the 2 most common moral theory approaches to animal research (and the 2 rival philosophical accounts of morality to virtue ethics): deontological and consequentialist accounts.

Laboratory animal research is, and has historically been, a subject of deep moral controversy. Some are adamantly opposed to all harmful uses of animals in research, and others are dedicated to research on animals in the service of alleviating human suffering, contributing to veterinary medicine, and supporting food or environmental science. While most members of the general public support biomedical animal research generally, many are concerned that animals are only used when necessary for biomedical advances [ 1 , 2 ]. Even those who perform research on animals sometimes have ethical misgivings about their animal work and doubts about the value of some kinds of research [ 3 ].

Virtue ethics was a mainstay of both ancient Greek and Chinese philosophy but was less visible in contemporary thought until a revival starting in the late 1950s with the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe’s essay critiquing “modern moral philosophy” [ 4 ]. These days, virtue ethics faces concerns as diverse as whether it is action guiding and whether character traits actually exist in the way needed to support this approach to ethics [ 5 , 6 ]. So what do laboratory animal research and virtue ethics have to offer each other?

In the philosophical literature, animal research has mainly been addressed through consequentialist (primarily utilitarian) or deontological (primarily rights-based) theories. These theories are well suited to addressing questions about whether or when animal research is justified but less helpful in considering ethical issues internal to animal research. Issues such as whether a researcher who bonds with her animal subjects owes them a greater duty of care than one who does not or what the moral significance is of the positive or negative psychological—or characterological—effects of doing animal research. In terms of the animals themselves, utilitarian theories are concerned with sentient animal experiences and rights-based theories fundamentally with whether animals have the moral status of rights bearers. Yet neither is primarily concerned with what a good life would look like for the particular animals in question.

Virtue ethics emphasizes the role of an agent’s character in determining the moral value of an action, focuses on the significance of habit in developing good character traits, and transforms questions of welfare into questions about lives well lived. Rather than promoting rights or duties that are held or owed impartially, virtue ethics takes rich account of the context of an action (Who or what does the action engage? In what setting? In what manner?) as well as of the perception and feelings of the actor [ 7 ]. This mode of assessment creates a significant space for the moral dimensions of care and relationship. Further, in addressing how to treat other beings, virtue ethical thought is less focused on questions of moral status and more focused on the development and maintenance of virtues of character.

These features of virtue ethics make it particularly well suited as a framework for considering animal research. In what follows, I first give a bit more detail on the philosophical backdrop against which a renewed appeal to virtue ethics makes sense for laboratory animal research. I then turn to 4 key issues in animal research, addressing both how virtue ethics may help in our consideration of these topics as well as some potential limitations to the approach. These issues are, in particular: animal welfare, human-animal bonds (HABs), mentoring, and translational science value.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKDROP

The philosophical turn toward animal ethics in the later part of the 20th century found its iconic expression in Peter Singer’s utilitarianism and the animal rights view of Tom Regan. While these authors differ significantly in their theoretical bases for promoting animal interests, their united animal protection perspective and status as public figures created a more shared than divergent vision of practical animal ethics. Thus, while a utilitarian view of animal research must balance harms to the animal subjects against potential benefit to humans (and other sentient animals), Singer’s equal consideration of the interests of all sentient beings, combined with his pessimism about the benefits of animal research, created a context in which he could doubt the moral justification of most animal research [ 8 ,p92]. Regan, for his part, dismisses altogether the possibility of the moral value of harmful research on animal “subjects of a life” since such research cannot be justified on the back of prudential benefit to us [ 9 ,pp384-392].

Philosophers writing about animal ethics after Singer and Regan have offered insightful elaboration on the principle of equal consideration of like animal and human interests [see e.g., 10 ] as well as nuanced visions of how we should consider animal rights [see e.g., 11 , 12 ]. Others have taken a “political turn” in their approach, considering animal rights as part of a broader political philosophy [see e.g., 13 , 14 ]. Some writing in the aftermath of Singer and Regan rejected altogether the idea that animals have moral standing [see e.g., 15 ] or that we should cut back on biomedical research using animals [see e.g., 16 ]. More recently, 1 set of authors has argued that equal consideration of like interests can support even stroke research using nonhuman primates [ 17 ]. The important point for our purposes is that the dominant philosophical approaches to animal ethics found in rights and utilitarian views when applied to biomedical research specifically have focused on the questions of whether and when such research is justified.

Perhaps taking a cue from these debates, the sparse recent literature on virtue ethics and animal research has also parsed the moral question as one of justification [ 18 , 19 ]. In my view, however, virtue ethics is better positioned to reach into the world of animal experimentation and address the moral issues that arise specifically in the context of laboratory animal research [ 20 ]. Consider, for example, the following excerpt in which psychologist Harold Herzog describes the situation of his colleague whose brain lesion study with cats involved euthanizing them and examining their brains.

Perfusion, although not for the squeamish, is common and painless and normally entails no greater moral problem, and perhaps less, than the slaughter of a cow or a pig. However, to hold in your hand the disconnected head of a cat you have petted every morning for a year is, to say the least, unsettling. The other graduate students in Neibor’s laboratory knew how he felt about his cats, and two of them offered to do the “dirty work”; however, Neibor refused. The dozen or so perfusions took place over several weeks during which time, he became reclusive and depressed and shaky. It was clear that his need to confront the moral consequences of his studies involved considerable personal costs [ 21 ,p27].

One important question is whether this research was justified. Answering that question may require addressing the moral standing of the cats and the relative harms to them and potential for human (or other animal) benefit. A virtue ethical approach to the question of justification would focus instead on whether a virtuous (practically wise) researcher would do (or propose) the research. However, virtue ethics also makes room for considering the obligations of care arising from friendship (or HABs), directs us to consider the courage involved in Neibor’s choice to “face the moral consequences of his studies,” and draws attention to the question of whether habituation into such practices bolsters or undermines the virtues that should be cultivated in the context of animal research. This is especially salient in the context of today’s laboratory norms in which it is recognized that researchers and animal care staff with a primary responsibility for particular animals may experience psychological difficulty when individual animals are euthanized “even though the animals are often purpose-bred for research” [ 22 ,p15].

Of course animal research already has its own internal ethical framework, which is generated by regulatory and policy considerations and manifested through an animal welfare orientation and the internationally recognized 3Rs first proposed by zoologist William Russell and microbiologist Rex Burch in 1959 [ 23 ]. That framework calls for researchers to consider reduction in the number of animals used (or maximization of information gained from each animal without increase in pain or distress), refinement of the circumstances and methods of animal research to promote welfare and minimize pain and distress, and replacement of animals in research where feasible (or use of insentient animals or those lower on the phylogenetic scale) [ 24 ,p5]. It might appear, then, that virtue ethics can neither rival a utilitarian or rights approach to the question of whether and when animal research is justified nor improve on a 3Rs approach to the practice of this research.

Importantly, I do not argue in this article that virtue ethics can or should replace either the 3Rs or the broader moral theoretical perspectives of utilitarian and rights accounts. My goal instead is the positive elaboration of the contributions of a virtue ethical approach to animal research. Fortunately, I think it can do more than has been previously recognized. With respect to the justificatory issues, virtue ethics offers challenging alternatives to the primary focus on animal moral status, draws attention to promotion of animal good lives beyond questions of welfare, and places central emphasis on the character traits promoted or undermined by engagement in animal research. For the purposes of this paper, however, I focus mainly on what virtue ethics offers internally to the practice of laboratory animal research. Specifically, I argue that virtue ethics addresses animal welfare in unique ways, attends to the moral dimensions of care and obligation, and calls for special consideration of ethical habituation.

“Virtue ethics” does not denote 1 specific approach to normative moral theory but covers a wide variety of approaches that may diverge on a number of fronts, including how the virtues relate to human flourishing ( eudaimonia ), whether the view is compatible with a principle-based approach, the unity or disunity of the virtues, and what particular virtues or vices are envisioned and supported. To offer a virtue ethics for animal research, then, the theoretical assumptions and structure of the particular approach must be at least minimally specified. In this article, I rely on a generally Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics.

According to Aristotle, the virtues are those settled dispositions to act and feel according to reason that are both necessary for, and part of, living well as a human being. The particular virtues are specified within domains of significant human activity and fall within a mean, relative to us, between excessive and deficient responses. Courage, for example, is a disposition to respond to certain types of danger in a mean between the excess of rashness and the deficiency of cowardice [ 25 ,III.6.1115a6–III.7.1116a7]. The mean, moreover, is not a mathematical mean, but determined relative to general human as well as individual tendencies [ 25 ,II.6.1106a30–1106b7; II.8.1109a–II.9.1109b10]. Human beings generally tend toward fearful responses to danger, for example, and so the mean of courage is closer to rashness. Any individual, however, may tend toward the vice of rashness and so must correct her aim accordingly. And while a general account of the virtues can specify the relevant domains of human activity, as well as human tendencies in those domains, it cannot specify in advance the actions called for in each particular circumstance or in light of each personal tendency [ 25 ,II.9.1109b12–27; I.3.1094b12–1095a2; II.2.1104a1–11]. Such determinations are best made by the practically wise person who is able to accurately perceive both the moral contours of each situation and what action is called for [ 25 ,III.4.1113a25–35; II.2.1104a5–10; VI.13.1144b37–1145a7; VI.7.1141b9–23]. To feel and act virtuously is to do so at the right time, about the right things, in the right manner, toward the right recipient, and for the right end [ 25 ,II.6.1106b21–25]. Thus, good activity is both highly contextually determined and derivative of a good life overall (e.g., the life of the practically wise).

Animal research oversight prioritizes a welfare approach to the ethical treatment of laboratory animals, affirming that “all who care for, use, or produce animals for research, testing, or teaching must assume responsibility for their well-being” [ 24 ,p1]. Researchers may distinguish this approach from a rights perspective, which is viewed as having potentially abolitionist ramifications for the use of at least some sentient animals in laboratory research [see e.g., 26 ]. However, as we have seen, utilitarianism, according to which animal research is justified to the extent that it promotes overall welfare for all affected, may also hold a dim view of much laboratory animal research. Important differences between an animal researcher and an ethical utilitarian perspective thus likely hold despite the fact that both promote “welfare.” These differences may include how sanguine each view is about the benefits of laboratory animal research, the moral weight given to animal harms in comparison with human benefit, and the generality with which benefits of animal research are considered. With regard to this last point, for example, animal research is often justified in oversight guidance by global appeal to its necessity for the benefit of humans, other animals, and the environment [ 27–29 ], whereas a more localized assessment of the harms and benefits of individual research projects (as required by a utilitarian approach) may find on balance negative welfare.

In a more fundamental sense, while a utilitarian perspective is focused on the question of general ethical justification of animal research, animal research practices are constrained in their promotion of animal welfare by both the aims of the science as well as the nature of the research facility. Thus, for example, animal welfare is seen as crucial to successful animal studies as stress or illness can undermine the quality of data. However, even severe pain and/or distress is considered justifiable when needed for the aims of the science [ 30 ]. Similarly, laboratory animal welfare is necessarily constrained within certain basic parameters imposed by animal facilities themselves (such as the necessity of caging, lack of access to outdoor spaces, lack of natural lighting, and handling of species adverse to human contact).

How can virtue ethics intervene on, or differ from, the dialectic set-up between these ostensibly welfare-based approaches to animal research? One way is through the demands of the specific virtues that are part of a flourishing or well-lived human life, and the other way is through attention to the concept of flourishing as translated to the animal context. A central idea of Aristotelian virtue ethics is that the end goal ( telos ) of human beings is eudaimonia , which can be understood as a well-lived or flourishing life. For human beings, eudaimonia is achieved through “activity of the soul expressing virtue” [ 25 ,i.9.1099b25]. Importantly, I do not act virtuously if I do so egoistically to achieve my own happiness, but rather I must be motivated as prescribed by the virtue. Virtue ethics, then, is “agent-centered” in the sense that it looks to the character of the agent to determine the moral quality of the action. However, that agent-centeredness need not be a form of egoism when the good life aimed at is the well-lived life of virtue [ 31 ]. Most of the virtues, after all, are other-directed and even those (such as temperance) that are not are discordant with problematically egoistical aims. For example, appeal to temperance (a self-directed virtue) plays a crucial role in Porphyry’s (AD 234–305) treatise “On Abstinence from Animal Food” [ 32 ].

How, then, ought we to think about nonhuman animal welfare from a eudaimonistic virtue ethical perspective? Initially, the solution is simple. While the virtues have traditionally been construed with human interlocutors in mind, those such as compassion, kindness, mercy, loyalty, and benevolence are easily applied to our interactions with animals [see also 18 , 33 ]. Other virtues such as courage and justice may also relate to our treatment of animals in the right circumstances. Further, we might specifically expand some virtues to include our interactions with animals or the environment, for example, in respect for nature or fidelity to animal companions [see also 34 ]. Since acting virtuously is a necessary part of human flourishing, treating animals in the ways required by these and other virtues is straightforwardly part of living well as a human being.

We can break down the implications for laboratory animal ethics by considering compassion. Compassion as a virtue is a kind of multi-track disposition to be appropriately responsive to suffering on the part of others. To say the virtue is “multi-track” is to remind us that it involves a holistic concordance of action, feeling, and perception toward the good end of the virtue [ 7 ,p4]. The vice that is oppositional to compassion is cruelty, which most significantly for our purposes involves indifference to suffering. Between the virtue and vice are other states in which the agent knows what is right to do but struggles internally and may either behave compassionately but not with the virtue of compassion or may behave in ways that are not compassionate.

Let us posit that part of what compassion involves in the context of laboratory animal research is vigilance in enforcement and monitoring of humane endpoints for trials that may otherwise involve animal suffering. If this is correct, the compassionate researcher will be attentive to potential animal suffering, have an accurate perception of when a humane endpoint is reached, and will ensure swift enforcement of that endpoint. Researchers, in contrast, who enforce humane endpoints, but only reluctantly, will not be compassionate but will still behave appropriately. Those who fail to enforce humane endpoints because of other competing interests, for example to further the objectives of the science, will both lack compassion and behave inappropriately but will not necessarily be cruel, whereas those who fail to enforce humane endpoints and don’t care about animal suffering can be considered cruel.

Considering that at least some of the virtues demand ethical treatment not only of other humans but also of nonhuman animals thus frames animals as proper recipients of ethical care and also draws attention to the ways in which welfare for researchers themselves may be construed as a well-lived or flourishing life of virtue. Hence, the researcher’s ethical behavior is not judged merely by external constraints such as regulations or rules of animal care and use but by whether it expresses virtue and avoids vice.

Still, a focus on human flourishing alone obscures a primary benefit of a virtue ethical analysis of how we ought to treat animals, namely that such an analysis also makes room for the ethical significance of animal flourishing. The good life for an animal will depend on its characteristics and the environment to which it is best suited as normal member of a particular kind [ 35 ,pp203–205]. Elsewhere, I have argued that while animals are not capable of virtue, they do partake in other aspects of living well that are also necessary for human flourishing [ 36 ]. In the human case, these aspects are the external supports to virtue and include social, environmental, and physical features of living well. Further, despite lacking capacities for some requirements of virtue rooted in understanding—such as the ability to know that an action is virtuous or choosing an action for its own sake—some animals may be capable of at least some emotive and social proto-virtues [ 37 ]. Even the lowly mouse has been attributed empathetic concern for her fellow mice [ 38 ], though how to interpret these findings is far from clear. Thus, while animals cannot exhibit human virtue, they do flourish in ways relevantly similar to us through both the external contributions of environment, social support, and physical health as well as manifestation of characteristic proto-virtues.

There are other ways to link animal flourishing and concepts relevant to virtue ethics. In recent work, Bernard Rollin explores how animal welfare is connected to telos understood as a kind of common sense metaphysics of animal nature, which he describes colloquially as “the ‘pigness’ of the pig, the ‘dogness’ of the dog” [ 39 ,pX]. Yet Rollin does not rely on human virtue in his elaboration of what animals are owed. Rather, the basis of ethical obligation on his view is that undermining animal welfare through frustrated telos matters to the animal through some “negative mode of awareness in the creature in question” [ 39 ,p53]. Like Rollin’s appeal to telos , Nussbaum applies Aristotle’s conception of flourishing to nonhuman animals; however, she does so in the furtherance of her capabilities approach rather than a broader Aristotelian virtue ethics [ 40 ]. Rosalind Hursthouse, on the other hand, takes an Aristotelian virtue ethical approach to our treatment of animals and in so doing resists generally the construct of moral status [ 18 ]. Animals’ capacity to flourish thus does not, in her view, give them moral status in the contemporary sense of the term.

Delving into the most theoretically satisfying connections between animal flourishing, virtue ethics, and animal moral status is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important here is that attending to animal flourishing as a way of understanding the obligation to protect animal welfare has important implications for laboratory animal ethics. In particular, viewing welfare as flourishing demands that we ask whether and how it is possible for particular animals to live good lives within research facility spaces. For animals for which this is possible, applying the virtue of care will necessitate that we structure those animals’ environments in ways most compatible with their flourishing. For animals for which flourishing is impossible within the confines of a research facility, this approach offers an ethical critique of their use in research.

To illustrate this, let us consider how animal model choice is an ethical issue as well as a scientific and pragmatic one [ 41 ]. Take as an example a decision to use either common marmosets or rhesus macaques for a neuroscience study for which either animal would be appropriate but no nonprimate model is viable. Important relevant information includes facts such as marmosets, while primates, are relatively much smaller in size than macaques, breed well in captivity, and are easier to handle [ 42 ]. In terms of traditional welfare concerns, the choice may thus be posed in this way: “The species selected should have the lowest welfare cost resulting from experimentation, including transport to the laboratory, captivity, handling and experimental procedures” [ 42 ,p117]. So posed, the question is one of harms and benefits where the objective is to limit welfare harm and, to the extent possible, offer specific environmental enrichment.

Understood as a question about animal flourishing, however, we must also ask whether it is possible for 1 type of animal to live a life that is a good one for its kind in a particular research setting while the other cannot. Under that framing, breeding well in captivity may be interpreted as a sign (though not a certitude) that an environment is relatively more appropriate for a particular type of animal [ 35 ,pp200–204]. Similarly, ease of handling could have important implications for whether human-animal interactions are compatible with normal social development for the animals even if not typical in the animals’ natural setting. More significant for flourishing, however, is whether the social organization patterns, group infant support, and communication signals of the animals can be reproduced in the captive setting [ 43 ]. In this regard, it is important to also note that marmosets as a relatively newer laboratory research animal are less well understood by most primate researchers and are subject to a number of diseases in captivity as well as to poor “parenting performance” [ 44 ,p8]. The size of the animal, while related to welfare through nourishment and housing needs, is less significant to the broader question of flourishing than is the question of home-range size in a natural environment—which is reportedly relatively small for the common marmoset [ 45 ] and varies widely for the rhesus macaque depending on habitat [ 46 ].

The point of this example is neither to argue that marmosets can flourish in research settings nor that macaques cannot do so. It is instead to illustrate how consideration of these creatures as potential research animals should look beyond issues of scientific usefulness, cost, and efficiency to the ethical dimensions of animal model choice. In so doing, it is important to consider welfare not only in terms of set-backs and enrichment, but also how these factors contribute to whether and how a research animal may (or may not) lead a life that is a good one for its kind in the provided facility. Thus, the idea of flourishing in a eudaimonistic virtue ethics offers a conceptual lens through which to filter animal welfare in addition to its role as the aim of a well-lived human life.

HABs offer an important construct through which to consider the ethics of laboratory animal research as a practice in which animals and humans come into close social contact with one another. As characterized by Lilly-Marlene Russow, HABs involve reciprocal and ongoing relationships between individual human and nonhuman animals that hold the potential for increased well-being for both parties [ 47 ,p34]. So understood, HABs may be critical to furthering both research goals and laboratory animal welfare. For example, they may underwrite voluntary compliance of animals with research interventions, thus avoiding the use of restraints or other stressful manipulations of animals [ 48 ]. HABs may also generally support animal welfare by serving as a source of comfort or distraction for animals and in helping to motivate careful attention to individual animal needs on the part of researchers and caretakers [ 20 , 49 ].

HABs in the laboratory also have their risks. As illustrated in the previous example of Neibor’s cats, forming HABs risks feelings of loss or distress on the part of researchers or caretakers when protocols involve harm or death for the animals. Additional concerns involve avoiding biased or unfair beneficial treatment for some animals when an entire group of animals is in the researcher’s care [ 20 ,p139]. Within animal research, HABs have historically been viewed somewhat dubiously. Researchers avoided giving names even to animals like monkeys where HABs might be expected to form [ 50 ,pp49–50]. Naming animals was especially discouraged in print, where animals were instead reported on by numbers [ 51 ,pp72–75].

While animals used in research are still assigned numbers, the welfare-enhancing role of human-animal interaction is increasingly recognized, alongside the importance of training animals for research compliance to reduce stress [ 48 , 49 ]. At the same time, the recognition of the ethical complexity of HABs in terms of the relationship itself has received less attention. In guidance documents, outside of the attention to humane method, animal killing is viewed as a psychological rather than primarily ethical issue. Supervisors are advised that “Euthanizing animals is psychologically difficult for some animal care, veterinary, and research personnel, particularly if they perform euthanasia repetitively or are emotionally attached to the animals....” [ 24 ,p124]. To avoid negative psychological impact, researchers or veterinary staff may even be excused from the laboratory space when animals they have especially cared for are euthanized [ 52 ,pp186–189]. As anthropologist Lesley Sharp explains, however, there is another dimension to this attachment that more closely tracks our differential moral valuation of species. She writes, “the more sentient the species, the more likely such animals are considered ‘partners’ in research and thus their loss felt more acutely once they are dead” [ 52 ,pp138–139].

Traditional philosophical approaches to moral theory make room for special obligations to particular other individuals through the idea of associative obligation or special responsibilities [ 53 , 54 ]. While these special obligations are typically understood as applying to interhuman relationships, such as familial, friendship, role-based, or political association, they can be applied to the HAB case as well. Of import to our inquiry, both consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics must justify such special duties against a background presumption that ethical obligations are impartially owed. Indeed, ethical impartiality arguably underwrites the particular ways in which duties are extended to nonhuman animals within these theories (ie, through equal consideration of interests or extension of basic rights).

What particularly sets virtue ethics apart in the space of HABs is that it provides an ethical framework through which to view relationships (including HABs) that does not rest on a presumption of moral impartiality [ 55 ]. As right action is determined contextually by the practically wise person, virtue ethics easily accommodates obligations brought forward through particular relationships (including HABs) or for significant social roles (including medical researcher). Aristotle spends a significant portion of his ethics discussing friendship as a core aspect of the development and maintenance of virtue—through living in a community with other selves. While HABs cannot be considered friendships in the Aristotelian sense (as true friends are also virtuous), they can be expected to give rise to special obligations of care-taking and fidelity as in the case of special human relationships that are not full friendships (such as with parenting). Crucially, they can also be expected to play an important role in the development of habits of care as a core virtue in our interactions with nonhuman animals.

In this way, we can see that the tensions described earlier as “risks” of HABs are instead ethical questions in the balancing, for example, of the demands of justice with those of care and/or fidelity. Consider the concern that HABs may result in biased preference for some animals over others. Justice requires that we give to others what they are owed, while care can allow for preferential treatment in particular circumstances. In our example, however, if a caretaker has broad obligations to an entire group of animals, virtue is inconsistent with preferential care that undermines giving each what they are owed. Thus, it is important that the virtues of justice and care are not in conflict, but rather that the specification of what justice and care as virtues demand must be worked out in context. This is an important distinction because, at least on Aristotle’s view, being virtuous requires the virtues work as a unified whole within the practically wise individual [ 25 ,VI.13.1144b33–1145a2].

We can consider another example where the ostensible tension between justice and care or fidelity might resolve in the other direction. John Gluck describes how, in moving to a new faculty position from a research position in Harry Harlow’s laboratory, he was able to bring several monkeys with him [ 50 ,pp108–109]. In addition to animals he had worked with for his thesis, Gluck selected 2 animals with which he had bonded: Manny and Greta. He had previously “rescued” this pair from a brain lesion study by claiming their involvement in his research project and wanted to bring them with him because they were really his “pets” whom he hoped save from invasive research that might be part of their future in the Harlow laboratory [ 50 ,pp109–120]. He writes about the reunion upon arrival of the monkeys to his new institution (shipped by airline) this way: “To me they all looked like old friends, but I was particularly happy to see the stumps” (Manny and Greta were stump-tailed macaques) [ 50 ,p120]. This example raises broader issues of what Gluck could or could not have done to ameliorate any potential harm to other monkeys left behind in the Harlow laboratory. Could the practically wise researcher simply protect monkeys he had a relationship with but leave the other monkeys behind? It may be impossible to answer this question in hindsight. Other things equal, however, it does not seem that Gluck’s selection based in particular relationships with the 2 primates was unjust; indeed given his bond with them it may have been uncaring to make a different choice.

Let us return finally to the example of Niebor and his cats. Developing bonds with laboratory animals that will be subject to painful or distressing research interventions or killed at the end of a study may cause distress to the researcher. However, that fact does not determine whether it is virtuous to form such bonds because they may be the appropriate manifestation of care and compassion in the circumstances. Nor should it be assumed that the way to address the ethical implications of such a HAB is through avoidance of the psychological consequences of the bond. Instead, at least for Neibor, it was important to take responsibility for the fate of the cats through euthanizing them himself. If the research, with all of its implications for the sacrificed cats, was justified, then it is arguably morally courageous to take such responsibility. If the research was not itself justifiable, then a practically wise researcher should not allow it at all. Thus the apparently negative psychological effects of HABs in some cases may stem from action in keeping with virtue. In other cases, negative emotional responses to animal harm will be a signal that the research itself is ethically problematic. Positioning HABs, then, within a virtue perspective helps to illuminate the ways in which both positive and negative consequences of such bonds are ethically salient and not merely a matter of psychological welfare.

Mentorship plays a key role in establishing good animal research practices, and virtue ethics can help to position its ethical significance. Specifically, proper habituation in ethically good practices is critical for the development of the virtues. Aristotle understands the instilling of good habits in youth as sustained by virtuous social institutions as a key condition of developing into a practically wise adult [ 25 ,I.4.1095b4–9; II.1.1103b20–25]. Since the standard for ethically good action is the behavior of the practically wise person who “judges each sort of thing correctly” [ 25 ,III.4.1113a30] the role of a virtuous model to illustrate and guide correct behavior is a critical part of this picture. Extrapolating, we might consider sound mentorship in ethically robust animal research as a kind of professional habituation for junior scientist mentees.

One way to illuminate the role of virtue ethics with respect to habituation and mentorship is through considering the “situationist” critique of virtue ethics, which purports to undermine the very existence of virtues by attribution of human behavior to mere circumstance rather than stable dispositions of character [see e.g., 6 , 56 ]. This critique of virtue ethics, when applied to animal research, may highlight the influence of institutional pressures and laboratory norms incentivizing certain types of researcher beliefs and activities [see e.g., 57 ]. For example, research timetables may undermine efforts at nonrestraint engagement with animals due to the time commitment involved, or young investigators may learn to distance themselves from animal suffering through the use of scientific language and objective framing of science. Thus, apparently unvirtuous behavior is chalked up to social situations, not character traits. However, the virtue ethicist is also well poised to emphasize the importance of structural factors in determining behaviors. In so doing, however, she focuses on researcher habituation and reminds us that the development and support of practical wisdom has never been individualistic. Rather, virtue is acknowledged to be possible only in certain, in fact highly limited, circumstances that offer not only proper raising of youth (mentorship in our situation), but also material, social, and political support. Thus, instead of denying the possibility of virtue because of the socially situated nature of human behavior, a virtue ethicist must pay very careful attention to how the existing structures and norms of animal research undermine or reinforce the development of virtuous habits.

Given these necessary supports for the development of virtue, it is important to face head on the potential rarity of the practically wise researcher. Aristotle was critical of the general public as he deemed the “many” to be concerned only with the life of pleasure—he also thought that the practically wise had to be free male citizens. While we may be more optimistic (or egalitarian) about the potential for the development of practical wisdom, we would be sanguine indeed if we thought that most animal researchers, technicians, and veterinarians were exemplars of practical wisdom. But if most individuals involved in research are not virtuous in the full sense, why consider virtue ethics to be a helpful approach to animal research? Just as all moral theories need some role for character, they also all recognize the importance of action guidance through policies, rules, and laws. For virtue ethics, as for other moral theories, these may help to educate the young, ethically naïve, or those taking on a new social role. But they may also help guide (or even “control”) the nonvirtuous who act rightly only with internal struggle or through fear of externally imposed consequences.

At this juncture, a key supposition of taking a virtue ethics approach to the practice of laboratory animal research must be made explicit. It would be impossible to be a practically wise laboratory animal researcher if the abolitionist perspective is correct and no laboratory research using sentient animals is permissible. Thus we must suppose that there is at least some such justifiable research in order to posit the usefulness of the perspective of the practically wise researcher. This is a different supposition than the consequentialist claim that we should address the ethics of the practice as a way to lessen its harms given that such research is ongoing. From a virtue perspective, which animal research practices are justified is a contextually situated question—taking into account with whom or what, in which way, toward what end, and in what manner the activity is conducted. One worry about such an approach is its potential moral conservatism. If we start from the need to address ethical issues that arise within animal research, are we too comfortable already with the practices at hand? Will the “virtues” in that context be constrained by conventional understandings of the relevant social roles of researcher, veterinarian, or animal technician?

Concerns about moral conservatism offer important critique of any perspective that works to address ethical solutions from within an ethically controversial practice. My goal here is to raise and acknowledge this issue and in so doing to take note of a potential trade-off between the capacity of virtue ethics to provide moral framing for significant ethical issues arising in the practice of animal research on the one hand and its difficulty in providing a radical critique of animal research on the other. Unless the practically wise laboratory animal researcher is a foreclosed impossibility, however, such an approach adds ethical value to the discussion of animal research.

Animal research communities and the bodies that oversee them lean into the research enterprise with the assumption of the value, indeed necessity, of the use of live animals to achieve human benefits. Biomedical laboratory animal research would not be justifiable from a research oversight perspective without positing that such uses of animals are necessary to promote human and other animal health. The US Government Principles Guiding Research With Vertebrate Animals states, for example, that "The development of knowledge necessary for the improvement of the health and well-being of humans as well as other animals requires in vivo experimentation with a wide variety of animal species" [ 27 ]. Moreover, EU legislation makes clear that the appeal to benefit is justificatory in acknowledging that the use of live animals in research is not ethically desirable, but rather a necessity. EU Directive 2010/63 states, “While it is desirable to replace the use of live animals in procedures by other methods not entailing the use of live animals, the use of live animals continues to be necessary to protect human and animal health and the environment” (Preamble point 10 [ 28 ]).

Given the pivotal role of human benefit in offering presumed ethical justification for the use of animals in laboratory research, it is not surprising that animal research groups and animal protection groups differ radically on their overarching assessments of these benefits. As is often the case when the stakes are high, realities on the ground seem to fall somewhere in between. For example, while animal research is a mandated part of the drug approval process, it has also struggled with high attrition rates throughout the drug development process [ 58 ]. Low rates of success in drug development from compound discovery through to approval for use in patients may be due to the deficiencies of at least some common animal models in mimicking human disease and drug response processes and/or with issues of rigor and transparency of the science itself [ 59 ]. Mice, the mainstay model animal of biomedical research throughout the genomic era, have been increasingly questioned as adequately representative of the human problems that biomedicine aims to address [ 60 , 61 ]. And while historically much of medical advancement has been associated with animal research, some highly beneficial advances did not stem in a directly linear manner from animal to human research at all (eg, the smallpox vaccine), while others utilized animal subjects but proceeded through a leap to human application that would be frowned on in today’s biomedical oversight regimes (eg, the rabies vaccine).

How might attention to virtue help in an appreciation of the complexities of the translational value of laboratory animal research to human health rather than reinforcing these entrenched positions? In the previous sections of this article, moral traits such as care, compassion, and fidelity were raised in conjunction with particular features of animal research practices. However, in addition to moral traits, virtues of thought are a necessary feature of the wise person. While Aristotle discusses theoretical and practical wisdom, science ( epistêmê ), intuitive understanding ( nous ), and craft expertise [ 62 ], contemporary work on epistemic virtues relevant to science includes consideration of intellectual integrity, intellectual humility, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, and inquisitiveness, among others [ 63–68 ].

These intellectual virtues are recognizable to any well-trained scientist as crucial to good science practice. Attending to their proper development requires continual striving not only to achieve the promise of a scientific field but also to recognize and admit both limitations and failures. The argument to be made in a more capacious venue is that attention to intellectual virtue development is critical in furthering the moral imperative to do better in achieving the aims of translational science and validating adequate harm-benefit balances in animal work. This is not a plea that individual researchers simply do better in enacting intellectual virtues, but rather for institutional shifts that put into place an environment in which such virtues can flourish as part of habituation into best research practices. Factors that can support the development of these virtues include mentorship by researchers with the right kinds of experiences, oversight mechanisms that require attention to translational value issues, and institutional support for scientists willing to make major shifts in their approach to animal research for translational value reasons. Factors that may undermine the development of these virtues include grant mechanisms that focus only on “bedside” application value rather than contributions that animal research is better situated to make, publication cultures that focus only on positive results rather than negative or inconclusive experiments, and a lack of institutional transparency in animal use that leaves researchers feeling they have to hide or protect their animal work from public scrutiny.

Science researchers abide by significant regulatory regimes, which govern their care and use of laboratory animals. An overarching concern for animal welfare and the 3Rs provides a framework for the responsible conduct of this research. Animal research nevertheless remains socially controversial in part because sentient creatures are used in ways that do sometimes cause pain and distress and frequently terminate in animal euthanasia. Common philosophical approaches to the issue have aimed to provide a broader moral perspective by relying on ethical principles such as an equal consideration of interests or the protection of certain shared basic rights. In this article, I have proposed—and explored—what a virtue ethics perspective might add to the discussion. In so doing I have suggested that, while rights or utility approaches to animal research have been helpful in considering hurdles to the ethical justification of animal research, they have offered less insight into common issues arising in the ethical practice of such research. Laboratory animal research oversight, for its part, addresses these practical issues but not in a way that places them within a broader moral theory and so often not in a way that makes sense of their role in the ethical practice of animal research.

While the proposal to consider virtue ethics and laboratory animal research has come up against some hurdles in this article—specifically regarding the rarity of practical wisdom and the vexing issue of moral conservatism—some bright spots have also been illuminated. I have suggested, in particular, that virtue ethics can offer a coherent narrative for the ethical contours of issues arising in the practice of animal research as related to animal welfare, mentorship, HABs, and the evaluation of the translational value of animal work. While this narrative is far from complete, it is sketched here in outline to be filled in as the practice of animal research, and scholarship regarding it, develops.

Potential conflicts of interest. Author: No reported conflicts.

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Is Animal Testing Ever Justified?

The E.P.A. recently said it would move away from requiring the testing of potentially harmful chemicals on animals. Do you support the decision?

By Natalie Proulx

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On Sept. 10, the Environmental Protection Agency said it would move away from requiring the testing of potentially harmful chemicals on animals, a decision that was hailed by animal rights groups but criticized by environmentalists and researchers who said the practice was necessary to rigorously safeguard human health.

What are your thoughts on animal testing? Do you think it is ever justified? Why or why not?

In “ E.P.A. Says It Will Drastically Reduce Animal Testing ,” Mihir Zaveri, Mariel Padilla and Jaclyn Peiser write about the decision:

The E.P.A. Administrator Andrew Wheeler said the agency plans to reduce the amount of studies that involve mammal testing by 30 percent by 2025, and to eliminate the studies entirely by 2035, though some may still be approved on a case-by-case basis. The agency said it would also invest $4.25 million in projects at four universities and a medical center that are developing alternate ways of testing chemicals that do not involve animals. “We can protect human health and the environment by using cutting-edge, ethically sound science in our decision-making that efficiently and cost-effectively evaluates potential effects without animal testing,” Mr. Wheeler said in a memo announcing the changes. The E.P.A. has for decades required testing on a variety of animals — including rats, dogs, birds and fish — to gauge their toxicity before the chemicals can be bought, sold or used in the environment.

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Ethical care for research animals

WHY ANIMAL RESEARCH?

The use of animals in some forms of biomedical research remains essential to the discovery of the causes, diagnoses, and treatment of disease and suffering in humans and in animals., stanford shares the public's concern for laboratory research animals..

Many people have questions about animal testing ethics and the animal testing debate. We take our responsibility for the ethical treatment of animals in medical research very seriously. At Stanford, we emphasize that the humane care of laboratory animals is essential, both ethically and scientifically.  Poor animal care is not good science. If animals are not well-treated, the science and knowledge they produce is not trustworthy and cannot be replicated, an important hallmark of the scientific method .

There are several reasons why the use of animals is critical for biomedical research: 

••  Animals are biologically very similar to humans. In fact, mice share more than 98% DNA with us!

••  Animals are susceptible to many of the same health problems as humans – cancer, diabetes, heart disease, etc.

••  With a shorter life cycle than humans, animal models can be studied throughout their whole life span and across several generations, a critical element in understanding how a disease processes and how it interacts with a whole, living biological system.

The ethics of animal experimentation

Nothing so far has been discovered that can be a substitute for the complex functions of a living, breathing, whole-organ system with pulmonary and circulatory structures like those in humans. Until such a discovery, animals must continue to play a critical role in helping researchers test potential new drugs and medical treatments for effectiveness and safety, and in identifying any undesired or dangerous side effects, such as infertility, birth defects, liver damage, toxicity, or cancer-causing potential.

U.S. federal laws require that non-human animal research occur to show the safety and efficacy of new treatments before any human research will be allowed to be conducted.  Not only do we humans benefit from this research and testing, but hundreds of drugs and treatments developed for human use are now routinely used in veterinary clinics as well, helping animals live longer, healthier lives.

It is important to stress that 95% of all animals necessary for biomedical research in the United States are rodents – rats and mice especially bred for laboratory use – and that animals are only one part of the larger process of biomedical research.

Our researchers are strong supporters of animal welfare and view their work with animals in biomedical research as a privilege.

Stanford researchers are obligated to ensure the well-being of all animals in their care..

Stanford researchers are obligated to ensure the well-being of animals in their care, in strict adherence to the highest standards, and in accordance with federal and state laws, regulatory guidelines, and humane principles. They are also obligated to continuously update their animal-care practices based on the newest information and findings in the fields of laboratory animal care and husbandry.  

Researchers requesting use of animal models at Stanford must have their research proposals reviewed by a federally mandated committee that includes two independent community members.  It is only with this committee’s approval that research can begin. We at Stanford are dedicated to refining, reducing, and replacing animals in research whenever possible, and to using alternative methods (cell and tissue cultures, computer simulations, etc.) instead of or before animal studies are ever conducted.

Organizations and Resources

There are many outreach and advocacy organizations in the field of biomedical research.

• Learn more about outreach and advocacy organizations

Stanford Discoveries

What are the benefits of using animals in research? Stanford researchers have made many important human and animal life-saving discoveries through their work. 

• Learn more about research discoveries at Stanford

Animal Testing: is it Ethical?

This essay will discuss the ethical considerations of animal testing. It will examine arguments for and against the use of animals in research, exploring moral, scientific, and practical perspectives. The piece will discuss alternatives to animal testing, the current regulations and standards in place, and the role of ethics in scientific progress. It will also consider the impact of public opinion and activism on the future of animal testing. PapersOwl offers a variety of free essay examples on the topic of Animal Testing.

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Animals being sacred gifts given to us, they are the best part of our lives and provide us with a special way of love. They do nothing but bring joy and happiness to us. My whole life I’ve grown up with all different kinds of animals. I’ve had a dog named Shelby, two cats Ruby and Smokey, a bird named Cheeks, two hamsters Bernard and Sandy, and I currently have a dog named Rocky and a rabbit named Daisy.

I have always had a heart for animals, and they mean everything to me. It hurts me to see the way others treat animals in a poor way because they don’t deserve that. All they do is try to love, if you’ve ever been to someone’s house who has any type of animal, you can tell that they just try to kiss you by licking or if a cat rubs his/her head up against you. Some people believe that testing products on animals is good idea because, they feel as if using animals is safer than trying it on humans because they don’t have to worry about injuring anyone. Also, they test on animals to get results to see if it would work on humans and can be sold in stores. I believe this is wrong and cruel. Animals have no say, they can’t talk nor, can they express their feelings. It hurts not only me but many others to see these animals being hurt and seeing pictures of this cruel job people are doing. A majority of animals are just being held hostage, waiting for humans to just non-caringly start testing on them. Causing a lot of them get severely sick, or even die.

Several million animals are tested every year for various reasons. The testing had created lifesaving treatments for humans and animals. However, animal testing may be considered cruel and inhumane. Also, animals are very different from humans, some research results may end up being irrelevant. Animal Testing should only be utilized for serious type testing, for instance to save lives and cures for severe illnesses. But animals should not be used to be tested on makeup and other beauty supplies, because that can be tested in various of different ways.

Society has advanced in research by animal testing and many important studies have arisen by animal experimentation. For example, Russian Psychologist Ivan Pavlov studied dog behavior and Conditioning behavior and he came to some interesting findings that could be correlated to human behavior which involves learning to associate a conditioning stimulus that creates a response. Article Simply Psychology written by Saul McLeod, Oct. 08, 2018. However, there is an ongoing debate regarding the ethics of animal experimentation. An Article on The Ethics of Animal Experimentation, written by Stephanie Liou on July 6, 2010, In Huntington’s Outreach Project for Education at Stanford addresses the fact that animal experimentation has been used to gain knowledge about human disorders and diseases that could lead to specific treatment to help humans with diseases such as Parkinson’s and Huntington’s. My grandmother, Marina died from Huntington’s Disease and had research been more advance with studies possibly performed on animals they may have been able to prolong her life of found a way to keep the Huntington Gene dormant. Cures for many diseases may be found by testing medicine on animals. However, are animals less important than humans? Many animals are the same as humans and they can feel pain and happiness. My dog Rocky becomes extremely excited when I come home from college, jumping up and down, wagging his tail, licking me and loving me. When I leave to go back to college he becomes sad and his eyes become watery. We can’t dismiss the fact that animal have feelings and care just like humans. Just like babies, animals can’t speak up for themselves or protect themselves from mistreatment

Thinking about this more I wondered, could there be any other way to find information out about products other than using animals? Benefits of non-animal testing Animals in science/ Alternatives , In this article they talk a lot about what the non-benefits are for animal testing and one that stood out to me that they talked about is the use the humans’ tissue, the toxicity is a more accurate in experiments for testing, instead of animals. In the article it says that it has a rate of 85% accuracy compared to the rate of 61-65% . They always use human tissue that is donated which means it is not injuring anyone.

Following that leads into another benefit where non-animal testing is more cost effective and more time consuming. In the article it states, it takes animal studies months to do, and estimates that it can test five or six products for less than half the cost to study a single product in animals. It is more efficient to use the method of testing on human skin rather than testing on animals because testing on humans you will get more products tested on humans than you would on animals, which would lead to it being more costly to use animals because you have to buy more materials or products since only one single product can be tested on animals rather than multiple. Trying to research more about other ways to test products out other than using animals I came across this article according to Iowa State Daily Angelica states that the FDA believes animal testing is the only way to ensure new drugs will respond well to live organs and organ systems. This could be true in a way and totally understandable to know what the side effects are going to be before giving it to someone and something tragic happening to them like death or getting severely ill. Although that is a something that is important for us, we are also hurting animals and not really caring about it.

I believe animal testing is a very cruel action of people to do. Although there are some different viewpoints that will be discussed for being pro-animal testing. One of the pros I have found from is Animal testing has contributed to many life-saving cures and treatments Animal Testing . Yes, this could be very helpful to us, but these animals have no say into what is happening to them. They just get to be our guinea pigs and for us to experiment on them hurting them and not caring at all about their feelings. Yes, it is good that it helps us humans out for not getting killed and keeps us from getting severely sick, but we do not need to hurt and kill animals for our sake. We could stop animal testing now, but we decide not to. There are alternative testing methods that can be used without having to use animals. Then again that is a choice these cruel humans don’t get. It is like people who experiment on animals purposely want to be inhumane and kill animals.

After reading for a while and finding out that there are different alternatives for testing other than doing it on animals. I still am curious as to why they continue to test on animals? If there are different ways of testing now, which there are, since we are more advanced in our modern technology nowadays it would be more humane to conduct research without animals. Especially when there are alternative ways in testing such as plants and bacteria. Animals should be considered the last resort when it comes to testing. Scientist could even use unborn fetuses over live animals. As I stated above scientist have used human skin, leftover from surgery’s where skin and fat were taken out.

In this article Arguments against animal testing Cruelty free international , it expresses how animals don’t get many human diseases, many types of cancer, HIV, Parkinson’s disease, or schizophrenia In the labs they artificially induce these different types of illnesses in animals. This article argues that a lot of the times treatments that are said to be good because they were tested on animals often tend to be bad and don’t even take effect in humans. They are saying that animals shouldn’t be used for something serious when they know they are different, and it won’t have the chance to take effect. It is a waste of our time, money, and the animal’s lives.

According to the Pat Dutt and Jonathan Laythem, Phd in their article the experiment is on us; science of animal testing thrown into doubt . New scientific research has brought about doubt in the testing of several consumer products and everyday products, such as soft drinks, baby foods, cosmetics, shampoos, etc. contain synthetic chemicals as preservatives and the safety of theses chemical were based on animal experiments that used rabbits, mice, rats, and dogs. The results of these experiments challenged the fact that animal experiments are of direct relevance to humans. In summary repeated experience determined that when it comes to inflammation mice and humans have little in common, just like the previous article I talked about said as well. Basically, mice are a poor model for human disease and for trying to find cures. Unfortunately, several millions of dollars are being contributed towards animal research when instead it can go towards other ways to figure out cures for human illnesses.

As I have mentioned previously some different alternatives for animal testing, I have found this article that elaborates more on the different types and why they could be more efficient. In this article alternatives to animal testing; a review written by Sonali K. Doke and Shashikant C. Dhawale documents a procedure for alternative to animal testing, where they suggest three R’s; Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement. The strategy of the three R’s was put in place to make an animal experience more humanly. This approach motivates the use of minimal number of animals for the experimental purposes, to reduce the pain and distressed caused to the animals during the experiments. More advanced animals should be replaced with alternative methods and lower organisms. The reduction helps with the careful selection of study design. It can produce a more meaningful experimental results, like with vitro cell culture is a good way to screen the compounds. The refinement is specifically to enhance the cage environment by taking better care of the animals and reducing the stress of the animals. Lastly comes the replacement which is different alternatives to the use of animals such as in vitro models, cell cultures, computer models, and new imaging/ analyzing techniques.

Overall, alternatives to animals testing should be utilized first and for most. Due to the fact that they are less harmful and more ethical in keeping animals safe. Testing for animals should only be used when seriously needed. Animal testing is a serious issue where it is half and half mixed feelings people have about. There are some good outcomes that can come out of it, but there also some really bad issues that are associated with it too. Animal testing is very costly and time consuming and a lot of times isn’t always the cure or best way to research products or treatments.

ProCon.org. “”Animal Testing ProCon.org.”” ProCon.org. 2 Nov. 2017, animal-testing.procon.org/

Animals in Science / Alternatives. Harm and Suffering, www.neavs.org/alternatives/in-testing.

http://www.crueltyfreeinternational.org/why-we-do-it/arguments-against-animal-testing

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1319016413001096

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Animal research essay resources

Many students, from primary school to university, write assignments  that relate to the issue of animal research. This page aims to support  this by providing links to useful materials. It is especially useful to any students carrying out the Extended Project Qualification (EPQ) alongside their A-levels or Extended Essay as part of their International Baccalaureate studies. Those students should read the  section below. Beneath each link is a  Harvard Reference  for the book, webpage or document in question which can be used in the footnotes or endnotes of your project paper. For online resources it is common practice to add the date you accessed the resource in square brackets at the end e.g. Cressey, D., 2011. Animal Research: Battle Scars. Nature. [online] 23 February. Available at: < http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110223/full/470452a.html > [Accessed: 6 February 2013]

Extended project qualification (EPQ)

Many students carry out their EPQ on the subject of animal research or animal testing. This page aims to help students find resources which are relevant to their project. It is important for students to discuss their project with their project supervisor as many of the marks are contingent on this process. This page is aimed at helping students with the AO1 (Manage) and AO2 (Use Resources) assessment objectives of their EPQ. AO1 requires students to identify their topic and the project’s aims and objectives. They must then produce a project plan and complete their work, applying organisational skills and strategies to meet stated objectives. This page aims to help students get a handle on the topic of animal research and provide some inspiration for possible areas of further study. AO2 requires students to obtain, and select from, a variety of resources, analyse and apply this data in a relevant manner and demonstrate an understanding of appropriate links. This page will provide links to large amounts of relevant information that students can use for their project, however it remains up to students to critically analyse and apply it to their specific project focus. Click on one of the links below for resources on the specific area of interest surrounding the issue of animal testing:

History of animal research

Ethics of animal experiments, costs and benefits of research, regulatory systems and the 3rs, animal rights activism and extremism, general websites, featured news.

The animal research behind a new device to treat epilepsy

Ten organisations account for half of all animal research in Great Britain in 2023

Animal research statistics for Great Britain, 2023

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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Animal Testing — Ethical Statement For Animal Testing

Ethical Statement for Animal Testing

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Published: Mar 14, 2024

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Beyond Anthropocentrism: The Moral and Strategic Philosophy behind Russell and Burch’s 3Rs in Animal Experimentation

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• Published: 11 September 2024
• Volume 30 , article number  44 , ( 2024 )

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• Nico Dario Müller   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0866-8235 1  

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The 3Rs framework in animal experimentation– “replace, reduce, refine” – has been alleged to be expressive of anthropocentrism, the view that only humans are directly morally relevant. After all, the 3Rs safeguard animal welfare only as far as given human research objectives permit, effectively prioritizing human use interests over animal interests. This article acknowledges this prioritization, but argues that the characterization as anthropocentric is inaccurate. In fact, the 3Rs prioritize research purposes even more strongly than an ethical anthropocentrist would. Drawing on the writings of Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) founder Charles W. Hume, who employed Russell and Burch, it is argued that the 3Rs originally arose from an animal-centered ethic which was however restricted by an organizational strategy aiming at the voluntary cooperation of animal researchers. Research purposes thus had to be accepted as given. While this explains why the 3Rs focus narrowly on humane method selection, not on encouraging animal-free question selection in the first place, it suggests that governments should (also) focus on the latter if they recognize animals as deserving protection for their own sake.

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Introduction

The 3Rs in animal experimentation– “replace, reduce, refine”– are commonly understood to be a moral principle or a scientific principle whose application is morally desirable (Hobson-West, 2009 ). But what kind of moral philosophy underpins the 3Rs, if any? Readers of the classic text on the 3Rs, The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (Russell & Burch, 1959 ), have been perplexed by this question because the authors did not engage in any moral argumentation at all. It is clear enough that Russell and Burch considered animal distress to be of moral concern, but why they thought this and in what terms they thought about it remains obscure. Today, this obscurity still gives rise to conflicting interpretations.

An essential point of contention is whether the 3Rs rest on an anthropocentric moral perspective. Anthropocentrism is the philosophical view that humans alone matter morally for their own sake, while anything else, including animals, matters only indirectly insofar as it affects humans (Fox, 1998 ). Such views are controversial among animal ethicists because they tend not to give animals sufficient moral consideration. The question, in other words, is whether the concept of the 3Rs addresses animal welfare issues in science in a characteristically anthropocentric way. Some scholars argue that anthropocentrism is a key feature of the 3Rs, particularly because they prioritize human research interests over the interests of animals (Vorstenbosch, 2005 ; Lauwereyns, 2018 ). Footnote 1 Other commentators claim the exact opposite, that the 3Rs should be understood as non-anthropocentric given their focus on animal suffering in itself rather than any indirect effects on humans (Camenzind & Eggel, 2022 ), or that they rest on the specific non-anthropocentric approach of utilitarianism (Schuppli et al., 2004 ; Landi et al., 2015 ; Walker & Eggel, 2020 ).

Understanding the values that originally underpinned the 3Rs is still important today because these values shape how the framework operates– what questions it is built to ask and what goals it is built to achieve. The 3Rs are an intellectual and regulatory tool, and it is relevant to know whether that tool was built for a purpose other than the one we are using it for. Numerous countries today allocate significant public resources to 3Rs programs (Neuhaus et al., 2022 ). This includes jurisdictions in which animals are recognized as beings worth protecting for their own sake (see Kotzmann, 2023 ). If the 3Rs are indeed rooted in anthropocentric values, thus built to help protect animals only insofar as it serves humans, this raises concerns about whether 3Rs programs align with the values enshrined in their respective legislation. The prominent role of the 3Rs in current efforts to promote new approach methods might then need to be reconsidered.

This article makes three original contributions: First, it engages directly with the notion of anthropocentrism and sets it apart from other notions, such as disregard for animal sentience, to make it clear what it means to claim that the 3Rs are anthropocentric or that they are not. This helps to put the conflicting views of previous commentators into perspective (Camenzind & Eggel, 2022 ; Lauwereyns, 2018 ; Vorstenbosch, 2005 ) (Section “ The 3Rs and the Notion of Anthropocentrism ”).

Second, the article illuminates the original philosophical foundations of the 3Rs by drawing on the writings of C. W. Hume (Section “ The Original Moral and Strategic Commitments Underpinning the 3Rs ”). These writings contain a reasoned and coherent approach to animal ethics that is explicitly non-anthropocentric. However, Hume also strongly committed to a strategic principle of cooperating with vested interests rather than challenging them. This led to an overall program of protecting animals only within the bounds of human interests in using them. While Hume’s writings have received some limited attention (Balls, 2009 , 2013 ; Balls & Parascandola, 2019 ), the influence of his strategy on the 3Rs has not been discussed before.

Third, the article reflects critically on the lasting merit of Hume’s strategy, arguing that it lacks justification in the context of government policy and governance (Section “ The Limited Justification of Hume’s Strategy ”). This is because the principle of cooperating with rather than challenging vested interests is prudent only in positions of relative powerlessness (Section “ Conclusion ”). Overall, this article represents the first attempt to address the question directly as to whether the 3Rs are an anthropocentric framework and what critical lessons can be learned from the answer.

The 3Rs and the Notion of Anthropocentrism

Anthropocentrism is the view that all and only human beings have intrinsic value, have moral status, or matter morally for their own sake (Fox, 1998 ; see also Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2018 ; Brennan & Lo, 2022 ). The notions of “intrinsic value,” “moral status” and “mattering” can in turn be understood in terms of moral obligations (Warren, 1997 , p. 3; Müller, 2022 , p. 32): Anthropocentrism is the view that there are moral obligations to all and only humans, not to any non-human entity.

At its root, then, anthropocentrism is a view concerning the question towards whom there exist moral obligations– whom we owe their observation and who is wronged by their violation. This should be distinguished from the question why moral obligations exist or what they prescribe. As for the “why,” an anthropocentrist can endorse a variety of theories, including but not limited to contractualist (see Carruthers, 2002 ; Abbey, 2007 ), Kantian (see Callanan & Allais, 2020 ; Müller, 2022 ), and Thomist approaches (see Scott & Coetser, 2015 ; Macdonald, 2021 ).

When it comes to the question of what moral obligations ask agents to do, an anthropocentrist can advance a variety of views, too. Kant, to name one classic, argued that the treatment of animals affects human capacities that are required for morality, specifically the capacity for sympathy, and so we owe it to ourselves to refrain from cruelty to animals (Müller, 2022 , p. 60; Regan, 2004 , Ch. 5.5). But there is some leeway for theories to disagree on what exactly this anti-cruelty duty demands– for instance, on whether it implies a duty of vegetarianism (see Egonsson, 1997 ; Denis, 2000 ; Hay, 2020 ). This shows that the “to whom,” “why,” and “what” aspects of moral obligation are not completely congruent.

Because anthropocentrism is a view specifically about the “to whom” aspect of obligations, it should not be equated with views about the “why” and “what.” Consider, for example, the view that humans can treat animals whichever way they want, or that the interests of humans should be assigned greater weight than the equivalent interests of animals. Such views are better characterized as “human chauvinism” or “speciesism” (as discussed by Hayward, 1997 ) or as the rejection of “moral status unitarianism” (see Kagan, 2019 ).

The difference between the “to whom,” “why,” and “what” aspects of obligations is not always fully appreciated in debates about the 3Rs. For example, Camenzind and Eggel argue that Russell and Burch’s focus on sentient animals is a reason to think that they were not anthropocentrists ( 2022 , p. 497). But this conflates the “what” with the “to whom.” Russell and Burch certainly did acknowledge an obligation to diminish the distress of sentient animals, but this alone does not settle to whom agents owe this obligation. It could be an obligation to the animals, to other humans, to a deity, or anything else. Other commentators have argued that Russell and Burch’s focus on diminishing distress shows that they endorsed a specific non-anthropocentric theory, namely, utilitarianism (Schuppli et al., 2004 , p. 526; Landi et al., 2015 , p. 228; Walker & Eggel, 2020 , p. 8). This conflates the “what” with the “why” because a utilitarian grounding of obligations in a value to-be-maximized is not the only option. Russell and Burch could just as well have believed that diminishing distress is a divine command or a demand of a human social contract. In short, when it comes to the question whether the 3Rs are anthropocentric, the mere fact that Russell and Burch endorsed an obligation to reduce animal distress is neither here nor there.

However, some more nuance is necessary here. The “why, what, and to whom” aspects of obligations do not completely align, but they are also not completely disconnected from each other. Assumptions in one domain put certain restrictions on what can be compellingly argued in the other domains. For example, the “why” can restrict the “to whom.” Take the example of Carruthers’s view (Carruthers, 2002 , Chap. 5), according to which obligations arise from a social contract in which only rational agents participate. This kind of contractualist grounding of obligations makes it extremely difficult to account for obligations towards animals. The straightforward conclusion is that such obligations do not exist.

Similarly entangled are the “to whom” and the “what.” For instance, if obligations exist only towards humans, then animals can only be protected indirectly by virtue of standing in some relevant relation to humans. This makes it very difficult for anthropocentric theories to explain why we should devote any moral attention to animals who do not stand in that relevant relation to us. For example, a Kantian view that argues that animals matter only insofar as they affect a human’s capacity for sympathy has trouble explaining why humans should care about animals with whose expressions of pain they do not readily sympathize, such as fish, reptiles, or rodents (Müller, 2022 , pp. 76–77).

More limitations for anthropocentric approaches arise when they combine direct obligations to humans with indirect obligations regarding animals. The problem is that the former tend to outweigh or restrict the latter. In principle, of course, animal interests do not have any independent weight at all in such theories, as they derive all their apparent weight from overlapping with human interests. For example, an animal’s interest in not suffering matters in Kant’s theory only insofar as it overlaps with the human interest in retaining one’s capacity for sympathy. But the simplest and morally most desirable way to advance the human interests at stake– say, in safeguarding sympathy– typically does not require acting in full accordance with the animals’ interests.

Take the example of the brutalization of slaughterhouse workers. Assume that unrestricted animal cruelty would give workers an increasingly cruel disposition, making them dangerous to other humans. There is a human interest in preventing this effect, protected by fairly uncontroversial obligations of beneficence or nonmaleficence. This overlaps with the animals’ interest in not being made to suffer. But at the same time, some humans have an interest in meat production, and this interest is protected by fairly uncontroversial obligations too– say, to respect the freedom of other human beings. The best solution from an anthropocentric standpoint is to tolerate all the animal suffering that is necessary for meat production and to prohibit only “excessive” violence. This illustrates how anthropocentrism, because it considers animal interests only to the extent that they overlap with human interests, tends to minimize even the indirect moral consideration it grants to animals.

However, it would be incorrect to say that anthropocentrism strictly or “lexically” prioritizes human use interests over animal interests. Lexical priority would be given if interests in exploiting animals always came first and animal interests came after. But animal interests are never considered for their own sake in anthropocentric views at all, not even after all human interests have been attended to. On the other hand, situations can arise in which animal-friendly human interests prevail over animal-harming ones. For example, the practice of holding animal fights may be prohibited because the interest in safeguarding sympathy in this case outweighs the socially marginal interest in enjoying the spectacle. Thus, although anthropocentrism only considers animal interests insofar as they overlap with human interests and those human interests are often heavily restricted by direct obligations to humans, it does not strictly give lexical priority to human interests in using animals over human interests in protecting them.

Scholars who argue that the 3Rs are anthropocentric are concerned with the preference the framework gives to research interests over animal interests. The 3Rs concept is set up in such a way that the research objective is never questioned (Tannenbaum & Bennett, 2015 , p. 123). What we are to ask ourselves, according to Russell and Burch ( 1959 ), is whether there are any alternative methods, any ways to reduce the sample size, or ways to make the experiment less harmful to the animals, all without compromising scientific quality. We are however not asked to reflect on our choice of research objectives (what objectives are worth pursuing?– see Beauchamp & DeGrazia, 2020 , p. 22) or on opportunity costs (should we better pursue another bit of knowledge that does not require harm to animals?– see Lauwereyns, 2018 , p. 109). So, in deeds if not in words, the 3Rs do treat research objectives as lexically superior to animal interests. Footnote 2

Vorstenbosch ( 2005 , p. 341) argues that the 3Rs are anthropocentric because they assume that science is justified by its benefits for humans. Animal interests can justify more humane techniques, but they never make it impermissible to pursue a specific research objective. Similarly, Lauwereyns argues that Russell and Burch “suggested that we should just concern ourselves with avoiding ‘inhumanity’ in the technique” without asking whether the research objective itself was morally justified, and that in this way, their view “always, in every single case, places humans above other animals” ( 2018 , p. 14). In sum, the argument of critics who charge Russell and Burch with anthropocentrism is that the 3Rs treat the research objective as sacrosanct, considering animal interests only within the bounds set by the research endeavor. Footnote 3

Of course, one could argue that at the time of Russell and Burch’s project, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 (article 3, sect. 1) allowed experiments only “with a view to the advancement by new discovery of physiological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering.” While a formal requirement for harm-benefit analysis only entered British law with the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act of 1986, there was thus already some minimal regulation about acceptable research purposes. Equally, however, the Cruelty to Animals Act already contained certain requirements of refinement by prescribing the use of anaesthesia for painful experiments (article 3, sect. 3), and this did not stop Russell and Burch from thinking in greater detail about how refinement can be achieved and further improved. Thus, even though their silence about acceptable research objectives does not imply that Russell and Burch approved of just any research goal, one can ask if their unilateral emphasis on method selection rather than question selection is due to an anthropocentric tendency.

Notice, however, that the implicit prioritization of interests in the 3Rs framework is in fact more extreme than in anthropocentrism, as it assigns truly lexical priority to research objectives over animal interests. An anthropocentric approach would still have us question research objectives and minding opportunity costs. This is because these theories focus on all human interests, not just on human research or animal use interests. The 3Rs, by contrast, are built to accept the latter in every case.

Within the limits of the research objective, however, the 3Rs do not discriminate between animal interests that overlap with human interests and those that do not. Russell and Burch were concerned with animal distress ( 1959 , Chap. 2), not with how animal distress affects humans. Their emphasis on the words “humanity” and “inhumanity” can be misleading here at first glance, as it seems to highlight the moral disposition of the human agent. But Russell and Burch made it exceedingly clear that these terms must only be understood “in a purely objective sense to characterize the kind of treatment actually applied to an animal– in terms of the effect on the latter” (ibid.). While, to repeat, the mere fact that Russell and Burch focus on sentient animals or on reducing animal distress does not show that they were not anthropocentrists, the fact that they explicitly focus on animal distress irrespective of its impact on humans is indeed suggestive of a non-anthropocentric ethic.

As a preliminary result, we can see that the 3Rs concept as presented by Russell and Burch is beyond anthropocentrism in two apparently contrasting ways: On the one hand, it prioritizes the research objective so strictly that it gives even less consideration to animal interests than anthropocentrism would, apparently accepting any research objective within the confines of United Kingdom legislation at the time. But on the other, it assigns moral significance to animal distress irrespective of any relation to humans, if only within the limits set by a given research objective. The reason for this odd combination, the next section will argue, lies in the philosophy and animal welfare strategy from which the 3Rs originally arose.

The Original Moral and Strategic Commitments Underpinning the 3Rs

While Russell and Burch did not offer much in terms of ethical argumentation, their client and employer did. This was the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW), an academic animal welfare organization, headed by its founder Charles W. Hume. His connection to the 3Rs was very close, as he had initiated the project of writing The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique , was involved in hiring decisions, and gave (sometimes rather harsh) feedback on the work in progress (Balls & Parascandola, 2019 ). Hume himself regularly spoke and wrote about scientific, philosophical, and theological issues, publishing many of his thoughts in independent scientific journals and in UFAW-edited periodicals and books (Hume, 1956 , 1962 ). These works provide a coherent approach to animal welfare ethics and organizational strategy that helps to better understand the intellectual basis of the 3Rs.

First of all, Hume’s philosophy is unambiguously non-anthropocentric. In his The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion , Hume wrote: “[…] a Christian’s duty to his neighbours cannot logically be restricted to neighbours belonging to the same species as himself. Charity is indivisible” ( 1956 , p. 73). Hume’s basic argument for this conclusion is negative: There is no good reason to exclude animals from the scope of moral obligations. Human-animal differences are gradual, not categorical, when it comes to sensation, pain, learning, reasoning, language, attention, aesthetics, emotions, personality, and perhaps even the sense of morality ( 1956 , pp. 40–49). Hume reasoned that one cannot categorically exclude animals from moral consideration based on merely gradual differences.

The only categorical distinction Hume was willing to entertain concerned the afterlife and the immortality of the soul. He was skeptical of the default Christian view that denies animals an immortal soul, questioning its theological pedigree on the grounds that it stems from Aristotle rather than scripture: “[…] the doctrine that animals have no souls which can survive death is of pagan, not Christian, origin” ( 1956 , p. 49, similarly 1962 , p. 183). The argument that most convinced Hume was that God made human souls immortal in the first place because he loves them and thus wishes to preserve them, an argument which extends to animals too ( 1962 , p. 167, 1956 , p. 50). However, for practical purposes, Hume was ready to accept the premise that animals do not have an immortal soul while humans do (see 1962 , p. 128), emphasizing that “our duty towards animals is a binding one, whether Aristotle was right or wrong” ( 1956 , p. 50). In sum, Hume made it abundantly clear that he was not an anthropocentrist. To the contrary, he had a deeply-held conviction that we have the very same duties of neighbourly love towards humans and animals alike. Footnote 4

In accordance with his non-anthropocentrism, Hume lambasted the “fanatics who say that mere animals must always be sacrificed to human interests; that any outrage, however horrible, may be perpetrated against an animal if the human race stands to gain by it” ( 1962 , p. 129). Once again, it is abundantly clear that Hume did not take human interests in using animals to be lexically superior to animal interests on moral grounds.

Second, Hume’s moral outlook was anti-speciesist avant la lettre : “[…] is it more objectionable to hurt a man than an animal? I should say definitely not, and if anybody thinks that it is, it is pertinent to put the question ‘Why?’” ( 1962 , p. 130). On another occasion, too, Hume emphasized that when it comes to the infliction of pain, there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and animals ( 1956 , p. 52).

The implications of Hume’s anti-speciesist view were limited, however, by a more specific argument about the ethics of killing. “To kill an important being is a more serious matter than to kill an unimportant one […]. Human beings are more important than animals, and it is a much more serious thing to kill a man than to kill an animal” ( 1956 , p. 51). By “importance,” Hume meant historical irreplaceability, as his example reveals: “If a cock sparrow is killed by the cat, his hen will in due course find another mate”, but “if the eleven apostles had all been executed on the first Good Friday, there would have been no Christian Church and no Christian civilization. Truly they were of more value than many sparrows” (ibid.). Hume also acknowledged that his view implies that killing people of great historical significance is a greater injustice than killing ordinary folk, but he emphasized again that inflicting pain on both is equally unjust (ibid.). Footnote 5

Although Hume’s argument only implies that killing animals is relatively “less serious” than killing (certain) humans, he went one step further and treated killing animals as morally neutral: “Animals are killed every day in the slaughterhouse (and legitimately, provided they be killed humanely), whereas to kill an innocent human being in peacetime is murder” ( 1956 , pp. 51–52). Hume never delved deeper into the question why killing animals should be morally unobjectionable just because it is painless, but he appeared to assume that animals are simply not harmed by death: “There is no harm in killing animals provided it be done painlessly” ( 1962 , p. 130). While this claim became the object of intense philosophical dispute only considerably later (see Kasperbauer & Sandøe, 2016 ), Hume also did not engage with opposing views that would have been available to him, such as Henry Salt’s ( 1894 ) writings in defense of a right to life for animals.

The strength of Hume’s conviction that animal death is unproblematic deserves emphasis. Apart from painless slaughter, he also endorsed the practice of killing “unwanted puppies and kittens” on the grounds that “only a small percentage of animals can reach maturity in any case, for otherwise there would soon be no room left in the world” ( 1962 , p. 130). Another of his examples involved animal testing: “A method of testing milk for tubercular infection consists in injecting a preparation into guinea-pigs, killing the animals painlessly before the disease has reached a stage where it can cause any suffering, and then making a post-mortem examination. Nobody can reasonably object to that” (ibid.). Footnote 6

Hume’s views had a strong impact on the aims and methods of UFAW. The organization’s stated aim was “to reduce the sum total of pain and fear inflicted on animals by man” (UFAW, 1952 ), but not to reduce the number of animals killed. In fact, painless killing was a central method of distress reduction for UFAW. The organization published a series of pamphlets on “Kind Killing” that included instructions on how to gas, shoot, or knock dead animals of various species (UFAW, 1950 , 1967 ; see also Nature, 1955 ). The organization also devoted extensive time and resources to determine the conditions under which electrocution was painless in meat production (Hume, 1962 , pp. 71–92), while never recognizably supporting lower meat consumption or collaborating with any vegetarian societies of its day. Overall, UFAW in Hume’s day devoted considerable efforts to the promotion of painless killing as a method of reducing distress. Russell and Burch, too, hail working with painlessly killed animals as a harmless replacement technique ( 1959 , Chap. 5).

However, even if one shares Hume’s moral views, they do not explain why the 3Rs treat research objectives as having lexical priority over animal welfare. We have seen that Hume endorsed a non-anthropocentric and anti-speciesist view that emphatically denied that death is a harm to animals, but such an approach could still advocate that certain research questions should not be investigated simply because they would require great animal suffering, or that one should purposely choose one’s research objectives so that they are achievable without animal distress. To understand why Russell and Burch did not develop a framework that instructs researchers to do this, we must consider not just Hume’s moral views but also the strategic views he expounded in his writings.

Hume’s strategy rested on two key commitments: The first was that strategies should be determined by facts, not feelings ( 1962 , p. 13). Both sides of the coin– being guided by facts and not being guided by feelings– were important for UFAW’s organizational identity. Given its academic background, UFAW laid emphasis on taking a scientific approach to animal welfare issues (Hume, 1962 , p. 14). According to Hume, UFAW prioritized issues in proportion to the intensity and duration of suffering involved, the number of animals affected, and the feasibility of practical reforms ( 1962 , p. 15). On the flipside, Hume thought that laypeople are poor judges of what should be done for animals due to ignorance and sentimentality– “the welfare of animals depends on factors lying beyond the ken of many animal-lovers” ( 1962 , p. 14). He thus emphasized that UFAW did not choose its policies by popularity and was not influenced by “cranky pressure groups” ( 1962 , p. 15). To Hume’s mind, this was the problem of traditional animal welfare organizations who devoted too much of their time to rescuing stray animals and of antivivisectionists who made popular, but unrealistic demands ( 1962 , pp. 13–14). UFAW also ran ads that read “are you interested in animals without being a fanatic?” (UFAW, 1958 ), emphasizing its anti-sentimental and pragmatic approach.

The second key commitment of Hume’s strategy lay in cooperating with agents who use animals rather than challenging them, such as farmers and scientists. For a start, Hume fundamentally rejected any adversarial approach to political activism, writing that “perhaps the most important rule of all for avoiding quarrels and resentments is this: never to impute motives ” (16, original emphasis). By this he meant that one should not assume any ill will on the part of animal users. This approach is also clearly reflected in Chap. 2 of the Principles , where Russell and Burch emphasize in all-capital letters that their terms “humanity” and “inhumanity” “MUST NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY ETHICAL CRITICISM OR EVEN PSYCHOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF PERSONS PRACTICING ANY GIVEN PROCEDURE” ( 1959 , Chap. 2, original capitalization).

In principle, however, even if one does not assume any ill will on the part of animal users, one could approach them in a challenging rather than cooperative way. As a rule, Hume and UFAW did not do this. “Most people, in this country at all events, have some sympathy for animals”, Hume wrote ( 1962 , p. 16), continuing: “With this fact in mind, UFAW tries to enlist the help of persons who are actively engaged in occupations which entail a risk of suffering for animals” (ibid.). His operative assumption, it appears, is that most people who use animals would prefer to safeguard animal welfare, other things being equal.

It is noteworthy that this approach was taken not just towards animal researchers, but also rabbit trappers and even whalers ( 1962 , pp. 16–17). For rabbit trappers, Hume and his colleagues advocated using a particular, supposedly less painful trap called the Lewis Humane Snare– a campaign for which Hume later apologized, apparently considering it misguided in hindsight ( 1962 , p. 30). For whalers, UFAW promoted the electric harpoon as a refinement alternative to explosive harpoons, but this innovation never took off ( 1962 , p. 215).

It is this maximum of charity towards, and willingness to cooperate with, animal users that truly explains why the 3Rs treat research objectives as sacrosanct and focus only on promoting more humane ways of achieving them, effectively assigning lexical priority to research interests over animal interests. Footnote 7 When it came to animal research, Hume and UFAW sought to enlist animal researchers as voluntary collaborators, which was possible only if their research objectives were accepted as given.

In conclusion, it is by no means moral anthropocentrism that led Russell and Burch to treat research objectives as sacrosanct, but a general strategic approach of cooperating with animal users rather than challenging them. This strategy led Hume’s non-anthropocentric, anti-speciesist moral outlook to promote a 3Rs framework that disregards animal interests even more than anthropocentrism.

The Limited Justification of Hume’s Strategy

It is not difficult to see the appeal of Hume’s strategy. It avoids direct conflict with vested interests in using animals by focusing on the scientific investigation of ways in which these interests could be satisfied in more humane ways. However, it is worth reflecting critically on the approach and its assumptions.

First, Hume’s claim that everyone has a baseline of sympathy for animals ( 1962 , p. 16) deserves some critical attention. This claim is crucial because it explains why seeking cooperation with vested interests, including rabbit trappers and whalers, is not futile for an animal welfare organization. The problem is that almost any measure to safeguard animal welfare– be it only to switch from an explosive harpoon to an electric one– involves some transition costs. Personnel may need to be retrained (risking resentment and conflict), procedures redesigned, equipment acquired or rearranged. So Hume’s strategy cannot be justified by appealing to the modest assumption that animal users will prefer the more animal-friendly option if all other conditions are equal, but must assume the bolder claim that sympathy can even motivate them to accept extra costs to some relevant degree. Of course, one can argue, as did Russell and Burch ( 1959 , Ch. 7), that humane techniques come with added benefits for humans, such as better data. But even then, there must be some reason why these benefits were not already sought. Among seasoned veterans of a given animal-using trade, this reason will often not be plain ignorance of better options, but transition costs. It is not enough for a more humane harpoon to be more economical once installed, but it also needs to be affordable, easy enough to install and use, and accepted by the crew. Hume’s strategy rests on the fundamental trust that animal users will accept transition costs due to their sympathy for animals. But this is likely true for some agents in some circumstances, not for others. It was evidently not true for whalers, as Hume himself admits that the electric harpoon failed due to “obstruction by gunners” ( 1962 , p. 215).

Yet, contrary to the evidence, Hume assumed as a matter of principle that anyone is sympathetic enough to accept extra costs for the sake of animal welfare. His reasons for this assumption are not entirely clear, but could be sought in his Christian values or in his national pride, since he primarily ascribed sympathy to British people (ibid.) and repeatedly highlighted that other countries were much more cruel to animals ( 1962 , pp. 49, 63, 92, 123, 126–128, 203–204). Hume even blamed the failure of the electric harpoon on Japanese influence ( 1962 , p. 215). Whatever the reasons for Hume’s blanket assumption of sympathy may have been, they seem questionable from a facts-based standpoint. Sometimes, a force stronger than sympathy may be required to motivate animal users to cooperate, such as economic interests or the threat of legal repercussions.

Secondly, in what conditions is Hume’s strategy advisable? Trying to enlist the voluntary cooperation of vested interests may be prudent if one is in a position of relative powerlessness. When rabbit trappers, whalers, and animal researchers have plenty of resources, far-reaching networks, and the law on their side, they are under no pressure to do as activists ask. This is a basic strategic problem for activists. But rather than attempting to reduce the power differential, say, by building up a more powerful movement for animals or by lowering the public standing of vested interests by launching outrage campaigns, Hume and early UFAW chose to work within the power differential. Their approach can be understood to offer low-cost (but not no-cost) animal welfare solutions, such as the Lewis Humane Snare, the electric harpoon, and humane experimental techniques. The key function of these solutions is to appeal to the conscience of the animal users themselves in order to achieve small-but-tangible benefits for animals.

That Hume’s cooperative approach was conditional on a power differential can be seen from the starkly different way he wrote about cruelty in young boys: “Many boys pass through a sadistic phase in which they destroy birds’ nests, maltreat young birds, inflate frogs, torture hedgehogs, etc. Such cases call for either psychiatric or castigatory treatment but are all too common” ( 1962 , p. 217). It would obviously be absurd to call for a cooperation with young boys to determine scientifically how they might inflate frogs in more humane ways, perhaps by killing the frogs painlessly first. Adults have power over children, so the problem is straightforwardly addressed by mandatory rules and not voluntary cooperation.

Obvious as it is, the conditionality of Hume’s strategic approach on a position of relative powerlessness is important to consider. It suggests that relying on the 3Rs framework, with its hands-off approach to the choice of research objectives, may be more justified in some contexts and less justified in others. It makes some strategic sense for animal welfare organizations because they have no influence over what objectives are being researched. But it does not make the same strategic sense for governments who regulate and fund research. In spite of this, the 3Rs remain central to many governments’ attempts to promote animal welfare in science (see Neuhaus et al., 2022 for an overview).

Of course, in a liberal spirit, governments may want to refrain as far as possible from exercising their power to ban any forms of research. But they also have the power to fund some types of research more than others, and to fund research infrastructure, networks, platforms, and conferences according to their own policy goals. They also have the power to create new institutional bodies to oversee and advise on progress. More ideas for how governments can go beyond the 3Rs can be found in political calls for phase-out planning for animal experimentation (see Müller, 2024 for an overview). If a government today recognizes animals as worth protecting for their own sake (as many do, see Kotzmann, 2023 ), then it should consider policy measures beyond the mere allocation of resources to the 3Rs.

This article has argued that the 3Rs should not be understood to rest on an anthropocentric moral theory, pace previous contributions. A more compelling rationale for the framework’s prioritization of research interests over animal interests is that it rests on an animal-centered ethic that is restricted by strategic considerations in line with the thinking of C. W. Hume. The article closed with critical comments on this strategic approach, highlighting in particular that animal users’ willingness to cooperate should be judged by the evidence, not based on a blanket principle of charity, and that the cooperative approach is advisable mainly in positions of relative powerlessness. This suggests that governments, who hold various forms of power in their jurisdiction, should explore ways to influence the selection of animal-friendly research objectives and not focus solely on the 3Rs and humane experimental technique.

By a “human” research objective, I mean an objective chosen by the human researcher, not necessarily an objective aiming only at benefit for humans. Even if research aims at benefits for animals (be it the very animal under study, some or all of its conspecifics, or other animals), one can ask why Russell and Burch did not articulate a framework for animal-friendly question selection, but rather one for animal-friendly method selection, accepting questions as given. Direct moral consideration of animals could motivate a much more cautious approach to how we try to benefit them, including that we do not easily harm some animals for the sake of other animals.

While the research purpose is indeed taken for granted by Russell and Burch, some more recent approaches to the 3Rs consider reformulation of the research question a form of replacement. This is taught, for instance, in a course by the European Union’s Education and Training Platform for Laboratory Animal Science (ETPLAS, 2021 ). However, reformulation can only reasonably count as a form of replacement if the research objective remains the same (Kramer, 2023 ), such as finding a safe and effective treatment for some given condition. So even at its most progressive, current 3Rs teaching has departed only to a limited extent from Russell and Burch’s approach that targets method selection but not topic selection.

Marino ( 2020 ) also criticizes this prioritization but does not use the term “anthropocentrism.”

Hume’s explicitly religious argumentation further undermines the claim that the 3Rs are a utilitarian construct at heart (see section “ The 3Rs and the Notion of Anthropocentrism ”), as this would make it a secular approach. Hume’s ethic is better understood as based on a Christian idea of neighbourly love that extends beyond the species.

An implication Hume apparently did not see is that there could be people so historically replaceable that killing them is like killing a sparrow, and that these would make for excellent scientific models of the human body. Thus, even though this was certainly not Hume’s intention, his view might inadvertently imply the permissibility of experimenting on certain painlessly killed humans.

Of course, all it would take to reasonably object to that is the view that death is, in fact, a harm to animals.

Again, it may be noted that the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 contained some conditions for acceptable study purposes, but this does not explain why Russell and Burch did not try to improve on this aspect of the Act. They did, by contrast, try to improve on the Act’s requirement for refinement in the form of anaesthesia. This emphasis is best explained by UFAW’s organizational focus at the time.

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Acknowledgements

The author thanks three anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as managing editor Lida Anestidou, for their helpful feedback.

Funding provided by Swiss National Science Foundation, National Research Programme 79 “Advancing 3R: Research, Animals and Society” (Grant No. 407940_214850)

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Müller, N.D. Beyond Anthropocentrism: The Moral and Strategic Philosophy behind Russell and Burch’s 3Rs in Animal Experimentation. Sci Eng Ethics 30 , 44 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-024-00504-1

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The Flaws and Human Harms of Animal Experimentation

Nonhuman animal (“animal”) experimentation is typically defended by arguments that it is reliable, that animals provide sufficiently good models of human biology and diseases to yield relevant information, and that, consequently, its use provides major human health benefits. I demonstrate that a growing body of scientific literature critically assessing the validity of animal experimentation generally (and animal modeling specifically) raises important concerns about its reliability and predictive value for human outcomes and for understanding human physiology. The unreliability of animal experimentation across a wide range of areas undermines scientific arguments in favor of the practice. Additionally, I show how animal experimentation often significantly harms humans through misleading safety studies, potential abandonment of effective therapeutics, and direction of resources away from more effective testing methods. The resulting evidence suggests that the collective harms and costs to humans from animal experimentation outweigh potential benefits and that resources would be better invested in developing human-based testing methods.

Introduction

Annually, more than 115 million animals are used worldwide in experimentation or to supply the biomedical industry. 1 Nonhuman animal (hereafter “animal”) experimentation falls under two categories: basic (i.e., investigation of basic biology and human disease) and applied (i.e., drug research and development and toxicity and safety testing). Regardless of its categorization, animal experimentation is intended to inform human biology and health sciences and to promote the safety and efficacy of potential treatments. Despite its use of immense resources, the animal suffering involved, and its impact on human health, the question of animal experimentation’s efficacy has been subjected to little systematic scrutiny. 2

Although it is widely accepted that medicine should be evidence based , animal experimentation as a means of informing human health has generally not been held, in practice, to this standard. This fact makes it surprising that animal experimentation is typically viewed as the default and gold standard of preclinical testing and is generally supported without critical examination of its validity. A survey published in 2008 of anecdotal cases and statements given in support of animal experimentation demonstrates how it has not and could not be validated as a necessary step in biomedical research, and the survey casts doubt on its predictive value. 3 I show that animal experimentation is poorly predictive of human outcomes, 4 that it is unreliable across a wide category of disease areas, 5 and that existing literature demonstrates the unreliability of animal experimentation, thereby undermining scientific arguments in its favor. I further show that the collective harms that result from an unreliable practice tip the ethical scale of harms and benefits against continuation in much, if not all, of experimentation involving animals. 6

Problems of Successful Translation to Humans of Data from Animal Experimentation

Although the unreliability and limitations of animal experimentation have increasingly been acknowledged, there remains a general confidence within much of the biomedical community that they can be overcome. 7 However, three major conditions undermine this confidence and explain why animal experimentation, regardless of the disease category studied, fails to reliably inform human health: (1) the effects of the laboratory environment and other variables on study outcomes, (2) disparities between animal models of disease and human diseases, and (3) species differences in physiology and genetics. I argue for the critical importance of each of these conditions.

The Influence of Laboratory Procedures and Environments on Experimental Results

Laboratory procedures and conditions exert influences on animals’ physiology and behaviors that are difficult to control and that can ultimately impact research outcomes. Animals in laboratories are involuntarily placed in artificial environments, usually in windowless rooms, for the duration of their lives. Captivity and the common features of biomedical laboratories—such as artificial lighting, human-produced noises, and restricted housing environments—can prevent species-typical behaviors, causing distress and abnormal behaviors among animals. 8 Among the types of laboratory-generated distress is the phenomenon of contagious anxiety. 9 Cortisone levels rise in monkeys watching other monkeys being restrained for blood collection. 10 Blood pressure and heart rates elevate in rats watching other rats being decapitated. 11 Routine laboratory procedures, such as catching an animal and removing him or her from the cage, in addition to the experimental procedures, cause significant and prolonged elevations in animals’ stress markers. 12 These stress-related changes in physiological parameters caused by the laboratory procedures and environments can have significant effects on test results. 13 Stressed rats, for example, develop chronic inflammatory conditions and intestinal leakage, which add variables that can confound data. 14

A variety of conditions in the laboratory cause changes in neurochemistry, genetic expression, and nerve regeneration. 15 In one study, for example, mice were genetically altered to develop aortic defects. Yet, when the mice were housed in larger cages, those defects almost completely disappeared. 16 Providing further examples, typical noise levels in laboratories can damage blood vessels in animals, and even the type of flooring on which animals are tested in spinal cord injury experiments can affect whether a drug shows a benefit. 17

In order to control for potential confounders, some investigators have called for standardization of laboratory settings and procedures. 18 One notable effort was made by Crabbe et al. in their investigation of the potential confounding influences of the laboratory environment on six mouse behaviors that are commonly studied in neurobehavioral experiments. Despite their “extraordinary lengths to equate test apparatus, testing protocols, and all possible features of animal husbandry” across three laboratories, there were systematic differences in test results in these labs. 19 Additionally, different mouse strains varied markedly in all behavioral tests, and for some tests the magnitude of genetic differences depended on the specific testing laboratory. The results suggest that there are important influences of environmental conditions and procedures specific to individual laboratories that can be difficult—perhaps even impossible—to eliminate. These influences can confound research results and impede extrapolation to humans.

The Discordance between Human Diseases and Animal Models of Diseases

The lack of sufficient congruence between animal models and human diseases is another significant obstacle to translational reliability. Human diseases are typically artificially induced in animals, but the enormous difficulty of reproducing anything approaching the complexity of human diseases in animal models limits their usefulness. 20 Even if the design and conduct of an animal experiment are sound and standardized, the translation of its results to the clinic may fail because of disparities between the animal experimental model and the human condition. 21

Stroke research presents one salient example of the difficulties in modeling human diseases in animals. Stroke is relatively well understood in its underlying pathology. Yet accurately modeling the disease in animals has proven to be an exercise in futility. To address the inability to replicate human stroke in animals, many assert the need to use more standardized animal study design protocols. This includes the use of animals who represent both genders and wide age ranges, who have comorbidities and preexisting conditions that occur naturally in humans, and who are consequently given medications that are indicated for human patients. 22 In fact, a set of guidelines, named STAIR, was implemented by a stroke roundtable in 1999 (and updated in 2009) to standardize protocols, limit the discrepancies, and improve the applicability of animal stroke experiments to humans. 23 One of the most promising stroke treatments later to emerge was NXY-059, which proved effective in animal experiments. However, the drug failed in clinical trials, despite the fact that the set of animal experiments on this drug was considered the poster child for the new experimental standards. 24 Despite such vigorous efforts, the development of STAIR and other criteria has yet to make a recognizable impact in clinical translation. 25

Under closer scrutiny, it is not difficult to surmise why animal stroke experiments fail to successfully translate to humans even with new guidelines. Standard stroke medications will likely affect different species differently. There is little evidence to suggest that a female rat, dog, or monkey sufficiently reproduces the physiology of a human female. Perhaps most importantly, reproducing the preexisting conditions of stroke in animals proves just as difficult as reproducing stroke pathology and outcomes. For example, most animals don’t naturally develop significant atherosclerosis, a leading contributor to ischemic stroke. In order to reproduce the effects of atherosclerosis in animals, researchers clamp their blood vessels or artificially insert blood clots. These interventions, however, do not replicate the elaborate pathology of atherosclerosis and its underlying causes. Reproducing human diseases in animals requires reproducing the predisposing diseases, also a formidable challenge. The inability to reproduce the disease in animals so that it is congruent in relevant respects with human stroke has contributed to a high failure rate in drug development. More than 114 potential therapies initially tested in animals failed in human trials. 26

Further examples of repeated failures based on animal models include drug development in cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), traumatic brain injury (TBI), Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and inflammatory conditions. Animal cancer models in which tumors are artificially induced have been the basic translational model used to study key physiological and biochemical properties in cancer onset and propagation and to evaluate novel treatments. Nevertheless, significant limitations exist in the models’ ability to faithfully mirror the complex process of human carcinogenesis. 27 These limitations are evidenced by the high (among the highest of any disease category) clinical failure rate of cancer drugs. 28 Analyses of common mice ALS models demonstrate significant differences from human ALS. 29 The inability of animal ALS models to predict beneficial effects in humans with ALS is recognized. 30 More than twenty drugs have failed in clinical trials, and the only U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–approved drug to treat ALS is Riluzole, which shows notably marginal benefit on patient survival. 31 Animal models have also been unable to reproduce the complexities of human TBI. 32 In 2010, Maas et al. reported on 27 large Phase 3 clinical trials and 6 unpublished trials in TBI that all failed to show human benefit after showing benefit in animals. 33 Additionally, even after success in animals, around 172 and 150 drug development failures have been identified in the treatment of human AD 34 and inflammatory diseases, 35 respectively.

The high clinical failure rate in drug development across all disease categories is based, at least in part, on the inability to adequately model human diseases in animals and the poor predictability of animal models. 36 A notable systematic review, published in 2007, compared animal experimentation results with clinical trial findings across interventions aimed at the treatment of head injury, respiratory distress syndrome, osteoporosis, stroke, and hemorrhage. 37 The study found that the human and animal results were in accordance only half of the time. In other words, the animal experiments were no more likely than a flip of the coin to predict whether those interventions would benefit humans.

In 2004, the FDA estimated that 92 percent of drugs that pass preclinical tests, including “pivotal” animal tests, fail to proceed to the market. 38 More recent analysis suggests that, despite efforts to improve the predictability of animal testing, the failure rate has actually increased and is now closer to 96 percent. 39 The main causes of failure are lack of effectiveness and safety problems that were not predicted by animal tests. 40

Usually, when an animal model is found wanting, various reasons are proffered to explain what went wrong—poor methodology, publication bias, lack of preexisting disease and medications, wrong gender or age, and so on. These factors certainly require consideration, and recognition of each potential difference between the animal model and the human disease motivates renewed efforts to eliminate these differences. As a result, scientific progress is sometimes made by such efforts. However, the high failure rate in drug testing and development, despite attempts to improve animal testing, suggests that these efforts remain insufficient to overcome the obstacles to successful translation that are inherent to the use of animals. Too often ignored is the well-substantiated idea that these models are, for reasons summarized here, intrinsically lacking in relevance to, and thus highly unlikely to yield useful information about, human diseases. 41

Interspecies Differences in Physiology and Genetics

Ultimately, even if considerable congruence were shown between an animal model and its corresponding human disease, interspecies differences in physiology, behavior, pharmacokinetics, and genetics would significantly limit the reliability of animal studies, even after a substantial investment to improve such studies. In spinal cord injury, for example, drug testing results vary according to which species and even which strain within a species is used, because of numerous interspecies and interstrain differences in neurophysiology, anatomy, and behavior. 42 The micropathology of spinal cord injury, injury repair mechanisms, and recovery from injury varies greatly among different strains of rats and mice. A systematic review found that even among the most standardized and methodologically superior animal experiments, testing results assessing the effectiveness of methylprednisolone for spinal cord injury treatment varied considerably among species. 43 This suggests that factors inherent to the use of animals account for some of the major differences in results.

Even rats from the same strain but purchased from different suppliers produce different test results. 44 In one study, responses to 12 different behavioral measures of pain sensitivity, which are important markers of spinal cord injury, varied among 11 strains of mice, with no clear-cut patterns that allowed prediction of how each strain would respond. 45 These differences influenced how the animals responded to the injury and to experimental therapies. A drug might be shown to help one strain of mice recover but not another. Despite decades of using animal models, not a single neuroprotective agent that ameliorated spinal cord injury in animal tests has proven efficacious in clinical trials to date. 46

Further exemplifying the importance of physiological differences among species, a 2013 study reported that the mouse models used extensively to study human inflammatory diseases (in sepsis, burns, infection, and trauma) have been misleading. The study found that mice differ greatly from humans in their responses to inflammatory conditions. Mice differed from humans in what genes were turned on and off and in the timing and duration of gene expression. The mouse models even differed from one another in their responses. The investigators concluded that “our study supports higher priority to focus on the more complex human conditions rather than relying on mouse models to study human inflammatory disease.” 47 The different genetic responses between mice and humans are likely responsible, at least in part, for the high drug failure rate. The authors stated that every one of almost 150 clinical trials that tested candidate agents’ ability to block inflammatory responses in critically ill patients failed.

Wide differences have also become apparent in the regulation of the same genes, a point that is readily seen when observing differences between human and mouse livers. 48 Consistent phenotypes (observable physical or biochemical characteristics) are rarely obtained by modification of the same gene, even among different strains of mice. 49 Gene regulation can substantially differ among species and may be as important as the presence or absence of a specific gene. Despite the high degree of genome conservation, there are critical differences in the order and function of genes among species. To use an analogy: as pianos have the same keys, humans and other animals share (largely) the same genes. Where we mostly differ is in the way the genes or keys are expressed. For example, if we play the keys in a certain order, we hear Chopin; in a different order, we hear Ray Charles; and in yet a different order, it’s Jerry Lee Lewis. In other words, the same keys or genes are expressed, but their different orders result in markedly different outcomes.

Recognizing the inherent genetic differences among species as a barrier to translation, researches have expressed considerable enthusiasm for genetically modified (GM) animals, including transgenic mice models, wherein human genes are inserted into the mouse genome. However, if a human gene is expressed in mice, it will likely function differently from the way it functions in humans, being affected by physiological mechanisms that are unique in mice. For example, a crucial protein that controls blood sugar in humans is missing in mice. 50 When the human gene that makes this protein was expressed in genetically altered mice, it had the opposite effect from that in humans: it caused loss of blood sugar control in mice. Use of GM mice has failed to successfully model human diseases and to translate into clinical benefit across many disease categories. 51 Perhaps the primary reason why GM animals are unlikely to be much more successful than other animal models in translational medicine is the fact that the “humanized” or altered genes are still in nonhuman animals.

In many instances, nonhuman primates (NHPs) are used instead of mice or other animals, with the expectation that NHPs will better mimic human results. However, there have been sufficient failures in translation to undermine this optimism. For example, NHP models have failed to reproduce key features of Parkinson’s disease, both in function and in pathology. 52 Several therapies that appeared promising in both NHPs and rat models of Parkinson’s disease showed disappointing results in humans. 53 The campaign to prescribe hormone replacement therapy (HRT) in millions of women to prevent cardiovascular disease was based in large part on experiments on NHPs. HRT is now known to increase the risk of these diseases in women. 54

HIV/AIDS vaccine research using NHPs represents one of the most notable failures in animal experimentation translation. Immense resources and decades of time have been devoted to creating NHP (including chimpanzee) models of HIV. Yet all of about 90 HIV vaccines that succeeded in animals failed in humans. 55 After HIV vaccine gp120 failed in clinical trials, despite positive outcomes in chimpanzees, a BMJ article commented that important differences between NHPs and humans with HIV misled researchers, taking them down unproductive experimental paths. 56 Gp120 failed to neutralize HIV grown and tested in cell culture. However, because the serum protected chimpanzees from HIV infection, two Phase 3 clinical trials were undertaken 57 —a clear example of how expectations that NHP data are more predictive than data from other (in this case, cell culture) testing methods are unproductive and harmful. Despite the repeated failures, NHPs (though not chimpanzees or other great apes) remain widely used for HIV research.

The implicit assumption that NHP (and indeed any animal) data are reliable has also led to significant and unjustifiable human suffering. For example, clinical trial volunteers for gp120 were placed at unnecessary risk of harm because of unfounded confidence in NHP experiments. Two landmark studies involving thousands of menopausal women being treated with HRT were terminated early because of increased stroke and breast cancer risk. 58 In 2003, Elan Pharmaceuticals was forced to prematurely terminate a Phase 2 clinical trial when an investigational AD vaccine was found to cause brain swelling in human subjects. No significant adverse effects were detected in GM mice or NHPs. 59

In another example of human suffering resulting from animal experimentation, six human volunteers were injected with an immunomodulatory drug, TGN 1412, in 2006. 60 Within minutes of receiving the experimental drug, all volunteers suffered a severe adverse reaction resulting from a life-threatening cytokine storm that led to catastrophic systemic organ failure. The compound was designed to dampen the immune system, but it had the opposite effect in humans. Prior to this first human trial, TGN 1412 was tested in mice, rabbits, rats, and NHPs with no ill effects. NHPs also underwent repeat-dose toxicity studies and were given 500 times the human dose for at least four consecutive weeks. 61 None of the NHPs manifested the ill effects that humans showed almost immediately after receiving minute amounts of the test drug. Cynomolgus and rhesus monkeys were specifically chosen because their CD28 receptors demonstrated similar affinity to TGN 1412 as human CD28 receptors. Based on such data as these, it was confidently concluded that results obtained from these NHPs would most reliably predict drug responses in humans—a conclusion that proved devastatingly wrong.

As exemplified by the study of HIV/AIDS, TGN 1412, and other experiences, 62 experiments with NHPs are not necessarily any more predictive of human responses than experiments with other animals. The repeated failures in translation from studies with NHPs belie arguments favoring use of any nonhuman species to study human physiology and diseases and to test potential treatments. If experimentation using chimpanzees and other NHPs, our closest genetic cousins, are unreliable, how can we expect research using other animals to be reliable? The bottom line is that animal experiments, no matter the species used or the type of disease research undertaken, are highly unreliable—and they have too little predictive value to justify the resultant risks of harms for humans, for reasons I now explain.

The Collective Harms That Result from Misleading Animal Experiments

As medical research has explored the complexities and subtle nuances of biological systems, problems have arisen because the differences among species along these subtler biological dimensions far outweigh the similarities , as a growing body of evidence attests. These profoundly important—and often undetected—differences are likely one of the main reasons human clinical trials fail. 63

“Appreciation of differences” and “caution” about extrapolating results from animals to humans are now almost universally recommended. But, in practice, how does one take into account differences in drug metabolism, genetics, expression of diseases, anatomy, influences of laboratory environments, and species- and strain-specific physiologic mechanisms—and, in view of these differences, discern what is applicable to humans and what is not? If we cannot determine which physiological mechanisms in which species and strains of species are applicable to humans (even setting aside the complicating factors of different caging systems and types of flooring), the usefulness of the experiments must be questioned.

It has been argued that some information obtained from animal experiments is better than no information. 64 This thesis neglects how misleading information can be worse than no information from animal tests. The use of nonpredictive animal experiments can cause human suffering in at least two ways: (1) by producing misleading safety and efficacy data and (2) by causing potential abandonment of useful medical treatments and misdirecting resources away from more effective testing methods.

Humans are harmed because of misleading animal testing results. Imprecise results from animal experiments may result in clinical trials of biologically faulty or even harmful substances, thereby exposing patients to unnecessary risk and wasting scarce research resources. 65 Animal toxicity studies are poor predictors of toxic effects of drugs in humans. 66 As seen in some of the preceding examples (in particular, stroke, HRT, and TGN1412), humans have been significantly harmed because investigators were misled by the safety and efficacy profile of a new drug based on animal experiments. 67 Clinical trial volunteers are thus provided with raised hopes and a false sense of security because of a misguided confidence in efficacy and safety testing using animals.

An equal if indirect source of human suffering is the opportunity cost of abandoning promising drugs because of misleading animal tests. 68 As candidate drugs generally proceed down the development pipeline and to human testing based largely on successful results in animals 69 (i.e., positive efficacy and negative adverse effects), drugs are sometimes not further developed due to unsuccessful results in animals (i.e., negative efficacy and/or positive adverse effects). Because much pharmaceutical company preclinical data are proprietary and thus publicly unavailable, it is difficult to know the number of missed opportunities due to misleading animal experiments. However, of every 5,000–10,000 potential drugs investigated, only about 5 proceed to Phase 1 clinical trials. 70 Potential therapeutics may be abandoned because of results in animal tests that do not apply to humans. 71 Treatments that fail to work or show some adverse effect in animals because of species-specific influences may be abandoned in preclinical testing even if they may have proved effective and safe in humans if allowed to continue through the drug development pipeline.

An editorial in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery describes cases involving two drugs in which animal test results from species-specific influences could have derailed their development. In particular, it describes how tamoxifen, one of the most effective drugs for certain types of breast cancer, “would most certainly have been withdrawn from the pipeline” if its propensity to cause liver tumor in rats had been discovered in preclinical testing rather than after the drug had been on the market for years. 72 Gleevec provides another example of effective drugs that could have been abandoned based on misleading animal tests: this drug, which is used to treat chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), showed serious adverse effects in at least five species tested, including severe liver damage in dogs. However, liver toxicity was not detected in human cell assays, and clinical trials proceeded, which confirmed the absence of significant liver toxicity in humans. 73 Fortunately for CML patients, Gleevec is a success story of predictive human-based testing. Many useful drugs that have safely been used by humans for decades, such as aspirin and penicillin, may not have been available today if the current animal testing regulatory requirements were in practice during their development. 74

A further example of near-missed opportunities is provided by experiments on animals that delayed the acceptance of cyclosporine, a drug widely and successfully used to treat autoimmune disorders and prevent organ transplant rejection. 75 Its immunosuppressive effects differed so markedly among species that researchers judged that the animal results limited any direct inferences that could be made to humans. Providing further examples, PharmaInformatic released a report describing how several blockbuster drugs, including aripiprazole (Abilify) and esomeprazole (Nexium), showed low oral bioavailability in animals. They would likely not be available on the market today if animal tests were solely relied on. Understanding the implications of its findings for drug development in general, PharmaInformatic asked, “Which other blockbuster drugs would be on the market today, if animal trials would have not been used to preselect compounds and drug-candidates for further development?” 76 These near-missed opportunities and the overall 96 percent failure rate in clinical drug testing strongly suggest the unsoundness of animal testing as a precondition of human clinical trials and provide powerful evidence for the need for a new, human-based paradigm in medical research and drug development.

In addition to potentially causing abandonment of useful treatments, use of an invalid animal disease model can lead researchers and the industry in the wrong research direction, wasting time and significant investment. 77 Repeatedly, researchers have been lured down the wrong line of investigation because of information gleaned from animal experiments that later proved to be inaccurate, irrelevant, or discordant with human biology. Some claim that we do not know which benefits animal experiments, particularly in basic research, may provide down the road. Yet human lives remain in the balance, waiting for effective therapies. Funding must be strategically invested in the research areas that offer the most promise.

The opportunity costs of continuing to fund unreliable animal tests may impede development of more accurate testing methods. Human organs grown in the lab, human organs on a chip, cognitive computing technologies, 3D printing of human living tissues, and the Human Toxome Project are examples of new human-based technologies that are garnering widespread enthusiasm. The benefit of using these testing methods in the preclinical setting over animal experiments is that they are based on human biology. Thus their use eliminates much of the guesswork required when attempting to extrapolate physiological data from other species to humans. Additionally, these tests offer whole-systems biology, in contrast to traditional in vitro techniques. Although they are gaining momentum, these human-based tests are still in their relative infancy, and funding must be prioritized for their further development. The recent advancements made in the development of more predictive, human-based systems and biological approaches in chemical toxicological testing are an example of how newer and improved tests have been developed because of a shift in prioritization. 78 Apart from toxicology, though, financial investment in the development of human-based technologies generally falls far short of investment in animal experimentation. 79

The unreliability of applying animal experimental results to human biology and diseases is increasingly recognized. Animals are in many respects biologically and psychologically similar to humans, perhaps most notably in the shared characteristics of pain, fear, and suffering. 80 In contrast, evidence demonstrates that critically important physiological and genetic differences between humans and other animals can invalidate the use of animals to study human diseases, treatments, pharmaceuticals, and the like. In significant measure, animal models specifically, and animal experimentation generally, are inadequate bases for predicting clinical outcomes in human beings in the great bulk of biomedical science. As a result, humans can be subject to significant and avoidable harm.

The data showing the unreliability of animal experimentation and the resultant harms to humans (and nonhumans) undermine long-standing claims that animal experimentation is necessary to enhance human health and therefore ethically justified. Rather, they demonstrate that animal experimentation poses significant costs and harms to human beings. It is possible—as I have argued elsewhere—that animal research is more costly and harmful, on the whole, than it is beneficial to human health. 81 When considering the ethical justifiability of animal experiments, we should ask if it is ethically acceptable to deprive humans of resources, opportunity, hope, and even their lives by seeking answers in what may be the wrong place. In my view, it would be better to direct resources away from animal experimentation and into developing more accurate, human-based technologies.

Aysha Akhtar , M.D., M.P.H., is a neurologist and preventive medicine specialist and Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, Oxford, United Kingdom.

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Animal Testing for Scientific Research Essay

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Despite the fact that the present-day science makes no secret of the use of animals for research purposes, not many people know what deprivation, pain, and misery those animals have to experience in laboratories. If the atrocities committed for the sake of science went beyond research institutions, they would be regarded as violations of law. However, torturing and killing animals are regular practices for a vivisector. They receive literally no protection from violence.

The major argument supporting the idea of banning the experiments on animals is the overwhelming scope. The point is that it is allowed by law to isolate, burn, poison, starve, strangle or drown animals used for experiments (Festing and Wilkinson 527). They can be also made addicted to drugs and inflicted brain damage. Hardly anyone stopped to think that no matter how outrageously cruel and painful a testing can be, it is not prohibited to perform it even without the use of painkillers. Despite the fact that there are already a lot of alternative available, the law does not require using them (Kolar 119). Thus, the outdated brutal methods keep their position.

Such acts of violence could be partially excused by the necessity to test medications that are developed to save human lives. However, such kind of testing is even more inhumane as it is totally ineffective. Despite showing quite promising results in animal experiments, more than 95% of all drugs created annually in laboratories fail trials on humans, with only 19% of life-threatening side effects predicted. This implies that app. 120 million animals must be subjected to prolonged, intense suffering globally every year for 25 new drugs to be approved. Moreover, in particular cases, even those medicines that can be found among those 25, may present a threat to human lives. For instance, Vioxx – a medicine used for arthritis treatment – was tested on primates and other animals and proved to be completely safe. Nevertheless, its implementation resulted in about 150,000 death cases globally and caused more than 300,000 heart strokes (Armstrong 54). Thus, animals deaths turned out to be in vain as the results achieved seem totally inadequate to the sacrifices made.

Besides being forced to suffer from medications, animals are artificially induced signs of diseases that they do not normally get (e.g. schizophrenia, cancer, AIDS, all main types of heart diseases, diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, etc.) for investigating the symptoms. The major cruelty arises from abnormality of such experiments as animals have to develop symptoms that they cannot contract under any natural conditions. For instance, researchers can make a rat grow a tumor twice as large as its body, blind puppies, kittens, or rabbits, force mice to suffer from strokes, insert electrodes into the brain of monkeys or break their spinal cords. After these inhumane procedures, animals are simply thrown back into their cages without any attempt to release their pain. They are severely damaged not only physically but also psychologically as they stay in their cages in constant fear to be tortured or killed (Armstrong 67). It is hard to imagine that such treatment can be justified by the necessity to test a new kind of mascara or a liner.

People who believe that only unhealthy, naturally dying animals are used for experiments, are wrong – all the animals are absolutely healthy and strong. All of them can become victims: researchers use monkeys, cats, dogs, mice, rabbits, sheep, pigs, birds, fish, and others.

It is logical to conclude that such experiments must be banned if we want to have the right to call ourselves humans. Unlike many other cruelties that we commit, this one is not killing for fur, food or for saving human lives. It is killing in its pure form – for the sake of killing as it absolutely fruitless in terms of results. This is what makes such experiments so atrocious and inhumane.

Works Cited

Armstrong, Susan Jean. The Animal Ethics Reader . Psychology Press, 2008.

Festing, Simon, and Robin Wilkinson. “The Ethics of Animal Research.” EMBO reports , vol. 8, no. 6, 2007, pp. 526-530.

Kolar, Roman. “Animal Experimentation.” Science and Engineering Ethics , vol. 12, no. 1, 2006, pp. 111-122.

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