assignment of claims example

Assignment of claims

An untraditional approach to combining the claims of plaintiffs; how it differs from class actions, joinder, consolidation, relation and coordination

A large class of plaintiffs engages you to bring a common action against a defendant or set of defendants. As counsel, you resolve to combine the plaintiffs’ various claims into a single lawsuit. In this article, we touch on some of the traditional approaches, such as a class action, joinder, consolidation, relation, and coordination. To that list, we add as an approach the assignment of claims, a procedural vehicle validated by the United States Supreme Court, but not typically employed to combine the claims of numerous plaintiffs.

Class actions

In Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.” ( Id. at pp. 41-42.)

In California’s state courts, class actions are authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which applies when the issue is “‘one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” ( Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 968; see also, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760-3.771.) “The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” ( Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) “The community of interest requirement involves three factors: ‘(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” ( Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435; see Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq. [Consumers Legal Remedies Act]; cf. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23(a) [prerequisites for federal class action].)

Parties, acting as co-plaintiffs, can also obtain economies of scale by joining their claims in a single lawsuit. Under California’s permissive joinder statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 378 (section 378), individuals may join in one action as plaintiffs if the following conditions are met:

(a)(1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or

(2) They have a claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.

(b) It is not necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective right to relief.

This strategy of joining multiple persons in one action has been referred to as a “mass action” in some decisions involving numerous plaintiffs. (See Aghaji v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113; Petersen v. Bank of America Corp . (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 238, 240 ( Petersen ); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B) [federal definition of “mass action”].)

In Petersen , for example, 965 plaintiffs who borrowed money from Countrywide Financial Corporation in the mid-2000’s banded together and filed a single lawsuit against Countrywide and related entities. ( Petersen , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at pp.  242-243.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had developed a strategy to increase its profits by misrepresenting the loan terms and using captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that inflated home prices and induced borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they could not afford. ( Id. at p. 241.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had no intent to keep these loans, but to bundle and sell them on the secondary market to unsuspecting investors who would bear the risk the borrowers could not repay. ( Id. at pp. 241, 245.) Countrywide and the related defendants demurred on the ground of misjoinder of the plaintiffs in violation of section 378. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed all plaintiffs except the one whose name appeared first in the caption. ( Id . at p. 247.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. ( Id . at p. 256.)

Petersen resolved two questions. First, it concluded the operative pleading alleged wrongs arising out of “‘the same . . . series of transactions’” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact. ( Petersen, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.) The appellate court noted the individual damages among the 965 plaintiffs would vary widely, but the question of liability provided a basis for joining the claims in a single action. ( Id. at p. 253.) Second, the appellate court concluded “California’s procedures governing permissive joinder are up to the task of managing mass actions like this one.” ( Id. at p. 242.)

Consolidation

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a) provides that, “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See also Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 42.)

There are two types of consolidation. The first is a consolidation for purposes of trial only, when the actions remain otherwise separate. The second is a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, when the actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. ( Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 ( Hamilton ).)

Consolidation is designed to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to the various actions. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleadings, § 341, p. 470.) Unless all parties in the involved cases stipulate, consolidation requires a written, noticed motion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a); Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 514), and is subject to the trial court’s discretion. ( Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)

In a procedure somewhat similar to consolidation, under California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a), a pending civil action may be related to other civil actions (whether still pending or already resolved by dismissal or judgment) if the matters “[a]rise from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact” or “[a]re likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.” ( Id. , rule 3.300(a)(2), (4).) An order to relate cases may be made only after service of a notice on all parties that identifies the potentially related cases. No written motion is required. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1).) The Judicial Council provides a standard form for this purpose. When a trial court agrees the cases listed in the notice are related, all are typically assigned to the trial judge in whose department the first case was filed. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1)(A).)

Related cases are not consolidated cases. Related cases maintain their separate identities but are heard by the same trial judge. Consolidated cases, in contrast, essentially merge and proceed under a single case number.

Coordination

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 404, the Chairperson of the Judicial Council is authorized to coordinate actions filed in different courts that share common questions of fact or law. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500 et seq.) The principles underlying coordination are similar to those that govern consolidation of actions filed in a single court. (See Pesses v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 123; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 [complex and multidistrict litigation].)

Thus, for example, in McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804 ( McGhan ), the plaintiffs petitioned for coordination of 300 to 600 breast implant cases pending in 20 different counties. Coordination was denied because the motion judge found that common questions did not predominate “in that the cases involve[d] different implants, different designs, different warnings, different defendants, different theories of defect, different modes of failure, and different injuries.” ( Id. at p. 808.) Among other factors, the trial court concluded that it was impractical to send hundreds of cases to a single county and that the benefits of coordination could be best achieved by voluntary cooperation among the judges in the counties where the cases were pending. ( Id. at p. 808, fn. 2.)

The Court of Appeal reversed in an interlocutory proceeding, ruling the trial court had misconceived the requirements of a coordinated proceeding. ( McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) As the appellate court explained, Code of Civil Procedure section 404.7 gives the Judicial Council great flexibility and broad discretion over the procedure in coordinated actions. ( Id. at p. 812.) Thus, on balance, the coordinating judge would be better off confronting the coordination drawbacks (including difficulties arising from unique cases, discovery difficulties, multiple trials, the necessity of travel, and occasional delay) because the likely benefits (efficient discovery and motion practice) were so much greater. ( Id. at pp. 812-814.)

Civil Code section 954 states “[a] thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.” The term “thing in action” means “a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 953.) California’s Supreme Court has summarized these provisions by stating: “A cause of action is transferable, that is, assignable, by its owner if it arises out of a legal obligation or a violation of a property right. . . .” ( Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.) The enactment of Civil Code sections 953 and 954 lifted many restrictions on assignability of causes of action. ( Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club (1929) 206 Cal. 461, 464; AMCO Ins. Co. v. All Solutions Ins. Agency, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 883, 891 ( AMCO ).)

Thus, California’s statutes establish the general rule that causes of action are assignable. ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-892.) This general rule of assignability applies to causes of action arising out of a wrong involving injury to personal or real property. ( Time Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009; see also, e.g., Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381 [“‘assignability of things [in action] is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception. . .’”].)

Although the assignment of claims on behalf of others to an assignee, or group of assignees, is not unique, it has not typically been used as a procedural vehicle for combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. But, that’s not to say it can’t be done.

In fact, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned such an approach. In Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc. (2008) 554 U.S. 269 ( Sprint ), approximately 1,400 payphone operators assigned legal title to their claims for amounts due from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-distance carriers to a group of collection firms described as “aggregators.” ( Id. at p. 272.) The legal issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether the assignees had standing to pursue the claims in federal court even though they had promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. ( Id . at p. 271.) The Court concluded the assignees had standing.

In support of its conclusion, the Court recognized the long-standing right to assign lawsuits:

. . . [C]ourts have long found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts — both before and after the founding — have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. We find this history and precedent ‘well nigh conclusive’ in respect to the issue before us: Lawsuits by assignees, including assignees for collection only, are ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S . at p. 285.)

On this basis, the Court concluded:

Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in more modern decisions of this Court.

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S at pp. 285-286.)

The Court also considered the argument that the aggregators were attempting to circumvent the class-action requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. ( Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 290-291.) The Court rejected this argument as a barrier to aggregation by assignment on the grounds that (1) class actions were permissive, not mandatory, and (2) “class actions constitute but one of several methods for bringing about aggregation of claims, i.e., they are but one of several methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get similar claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum. [Citations.]” ( Id. at p. 291.)

Granted, Sprint arose in the context of Article III, a “prudential standing” analysis. However, in reaching its decision that assignees had standing, the Court relied significantly on three California state decisions addressing assignment of rights under California law. (See Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 294-296.)

Under California law, assignment of claims is not a panacea. Not all claims can be assigned. In California, assignment is not allowed for tort causes of action based on “wrongs done to the person, the reputation or the feelings of an injured party,” including “causes of action for slander, assault and battery, negligent personal injuries, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and malicious prosecution.” ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 [exceptions to assignment also include “legal malpractice claims and certain types of fraud claims”].) Other assignments are statutorily prohibited. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2985.1 [regulating assignment of real property sales contracts]; Gov. Code, § 8880.325 [state lottery prizes not assignable].)

Likewise, because a right of action cannot be split, a partial assignment will require the joinder of the partial assignor as an indispensable party. (See, e.g., Bank of the Orient v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 588, 595 [“[W]here . . . there has been a partial assignment all parties claiming an interest in the assignment must be joined as plaintiffs . . . ”]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleadings, § 131(2), p. 198 [“If the assignor has made only a partial assignment, the assignor remains beneficially interested in the claim and the assignee cannot sue alone”].)

That said, California’s rules of law regarding standing and assignments do not prohibit an assignee’s aggregation of a large number of claims against a single defendant or multiple defendants into a single lawsuit. To the contrary, no limitations or conditions on this type of aggregation of assigned claims is imposed from other rules of law, such as California’s compulsory joinder statute. (See Sprint , supra , 554 U.S. at p. 292 [to address practical problems that might arise because aggregators, not payphone operators, were suing, district “court might grant a motion to join the payphone operators to the case as ‘required’ parties” under Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 19].)

There are many procedural approaches to evaluate when seeking to combine the claims of multiple plaintiffs. Class actions and joinders are more traditional methods that trial counsel rely on to bring claims together. Although a largely unexplored procedural approach, assignment appears to be an expedient way of combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. It avoids the legal requirements imposed for class actions and joinders, and it sidesteps a trial judge’s discretion regarding whether to consolidate, relate, or coordinate actions. Indeed, under the right circumstances, an assignment of claims might provide a means of bypassing class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Perhaps an assignment of claims should be added to the mix of considerations when deciding how to bring a case involving numerous plaintiffs with similar claims against a common defendant or set of defendants.

Judith Posner

Judith Posner is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

Gerald Serlin

Gerald Serlin is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

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Assignment of Claims

Table of contents, understanding the assignment of claims.

The assignment of claims is a critical concept in the financial world, particularly in the realm of contract law. It is a process that involves the transfer of rights held by one party, the assignor, to another party, the assignee. This article delves into the intricacies of the assignment of claims, its implications, and its role in various sectors.

Conceptualizing the Assignment of Claims

The assignment of claims is a legal and financial process where an individual or entity (the assignor) transfers a claim or a right to another party (the assignee). This claim could be any asset, such as a receivable or a contract right. The assignee, upon receiving the claim, has the right to seek fulfillment from the debtor or obligor.

Assignments of claims are common in various sectors, including finance, insurance, and real estate. They allow for flexibility in managing assets and liabilities, and can be used as a tool for risk management or financial planning.

The Legal Framework

The legal framework for the assignment of claims varies depending on the jurisdiction. In many regions, the law requires that the assignment be in writing and that the debtor be notified. In some cases, the debtor’s consent may also be necessary.

It’s important to note that while the assignee takes on the rights of the assignor, they may also inherit any associated liabilities or defenses that the debtor has against the assignor. Therefore, due diligence is crucial before any assignment takes place.

Implications for the Parties Involved

For the assignor, the assignment of claims can serve as a way to offload debt or to manage risk. It can also provide immediate liquidity if the claim is sold for a lump sum.

For the assignee, the assignment offers the opportunity to earn a return on the claim. However, it also comes with the risk that the debtor may not fulfill their obligation, or that the claim may not be as valuable as initially thought.

Assignment of Claims in Different Sectors

The assignment of claims is a versatile tool that finds application in several sectors. Here, we explore its role in finance, insurance, and real estate.

In the financial sector, the assignment of claims is often used in factoring arrangements. Here, a business sells its invoices to a factor (the assignee) at a discount. The factor then collects the full amount from the debtor, thereby earning a profit.

Assignments also play a crucial role in securitization, where financial assets are pooled and repackaged into securities that are sold to investors. These securities are backed by the cash flows from the original assets, which have been assigned to a special purpose vehicle.

In the insurance industry, policyholders may assign their claims to another party. This is common in cases where the policyholder has suffered a loss and wants to sell the claim to a third party who will then seek compensation from the insurer.

However, insurance assignments are subject to certain restrictions and conditions, and the insurer’s consent is often required. This is to prevent moral hazard and to ensure that the insurer is not exposed to greater risk than initially agreed upon.

Real Estate

In real estate, the assignment of claims is used in lease assignments and mortgage assignments. In a lease assignment, a tenant may transfer their rights under the lease to another party. In a mortgage assignment, a lender may transfer the right to receive mortgage payments to another lender.

These assignments allow for flexibility in managing property rights and obligations. However, they also require careful consideration of the legal and financial implications for all parties involved.

The Bottom Line

The assignment of claims is a complex process with significant implications for the assignor, the assignee, and the debtor. It is a versatile tool that finds application in various sectors, from finance to insurance to real estate.

While the assignment of claims offers numerous benefits, it also comes with risks and challenges. Therefore, it is crucial for all parties involved to understand the process thoroughly and to seek professional advice when necessary.

Related Terms

Government Contractor

Federal Assignment of Claims

Defense Contractors

Veteran-Owned Small Business

Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB)

Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP)

Small Business Administration Loans

Small Disadvantaged Business

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Assignment of claims

Assignment of claims clause samples

(i)No Assignment of Claims. Neither ACLP, nor any other ACLP Releasor, nor anyone acting on any of their behalves, has ever sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of all or any part of the ACLP Released Claims released thereby hereunder, whether known or unknown.

05/27/2020 (Summit Wireless Technologies, Inc.)

9.No Assignment of Claims. Each set of parties represents and warrants to the other that it has not heretofore assigned or transferred, or purported to assign or transfer to any person or entity any claims that it might have against the other.

09/27/2019 (Green Stream Holdings Inc.)

13. Indemnity Regarding Assignment of Claims. Executive represents and warrants that Executive has not heretofore assigned or transferred, or purported to assign or transfer, to any person, entity, or individual whatsoever any of the released claims. Executive agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Company and its agents, heirs, executors, and assigns against any claim, demand, debt, obligation, liability, cost, expense, right of action, or cause of action based on, arising out of, or in connection with any such transfer or assignment or purported transfer or assignment.

08/08/2017 (B. Riley Financial, Inc.)

9. No Assignment of Claims. Employee hereby represents and warrants that Employee has not previously assigned or purported to assign or transfer to any person or entity any of the claims or causes of action herein released.

02/02/2017 (InvenSense Inc)

No Assignment of Claims.Casella warrants that he has not transferred to any other person or entity any of the rights or causes of action released in this Agreement.

05/09/2019 (NAVIGATORS GROUP INC)

8. No Assignment of Claims. The Parties each acknowledge and represent that they have not assigned any claim arising out of and/or in connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement and/or Side Letter Agreement Dated May 24, 2018 to any third party prior to the date of this Agreement. The Parties acknowledge and represent that they have not assigned any claim arising out of and/or in connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement and/or Side Letter Agreement Dated May 24, 2018 to any third party prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement.

02/01/2019 (PLAYERS NETWORK)

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Assignment of Claims

• First Online: 02 September 2017

Cite this chapter

• İlhan Helvacı 2  

488 Accesses

A claim arising from a contract or some other source of obligation, such as a tort or unjust enrichment, may be transferred to third parties. A claim may be transferred by an agreement, by a court order or by law. In this section, assignment of claims effected by agreement and those effected by a court decision or operation of law are analysed respectively.

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For further explanations, see Kocaman ( 1989 ), Dayınlarlı ( 2008 ), Günergök ( 2014 ).

Cession des créances , Abtretung von Forderungen .

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 4.

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 304; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 32–35; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1236; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 521; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 872.

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1237; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 872; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 305; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 36.

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 247; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1237; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 571–574; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522.

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 5; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 305; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 240; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522.

Déclaration de volonté , Willenserklärung .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 20; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 566.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 562–563; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 466; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449.

Acte de disposition , Verfügungsgeschäft . See Chap. 14 fn. 5–6.

Conversely, such a contract is an acquisitive transaction with regard to the assignee.

Pouvoir de disposer, Verfügungsmacht .

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 306.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 560.

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1231; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), pp. 241–242.

von Tuhr and Escher ( 1974 ), § 93, II, p. 333; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 560; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 465; Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 1. For further explanations see Honsell et al. ( 2003 ), art. 164, N. 23–25.

Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 569.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 563.

See Sect. 8.2.2 .

Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 566–567; Eren ( 2015 ), pp. 1234–1235.

See Sect. 29.2 .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 19.

See Sect. 29.3 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 250; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 61; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 307.

Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 524; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 574–575; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1238.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 577.

Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 641; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 241; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 575.

See Sect. 26.4 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 251; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 577–578.

For further explanations, see Helvacı ( 2008 ).

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170 fn. 30, cf. Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 260.

For further explanations see Çetiner ( 2010 ).

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1240; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 576; Oğuzman et al. ( 2016 ), p. 1049, compare to Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170, N. 9.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 576; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 450.

Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 259; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 578.

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170, N. 11; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 578; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 260.

For further explanations see Günergök ( 2014 ).

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 308.

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 167, N. 21; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 582–583; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 452; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 470.

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 168, N. 7; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 884; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 168, N. 4; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 656; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 583–584.

Öz ( 1990 ), pp. 57–58.

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 252 ff ; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 586; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1241

See Sect. 18.4.2.2 .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 169, N. 11; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 658; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 587; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1241.

For further explanations see Engin ( 2002 ).

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 591.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 593.

See Sect. 24.2 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 266; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1227; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 596.

See Sect. 25.4.2 , fn. 43.

The transfer of possession is of a factual nature. The material transfer of possession must be complemented by the parties’ agreement (referred to as a real agreement) concerning the transfer of ownership or the constitution of rights in rem . The real agreement is a bilateral legal act and does not require any specific form. It may be formed by the parties’ express or implied declarations of will (intention).

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Helvacı, İ. (2017). Assignment of Claims. In: Turkish Contract Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1_32

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31 U.S. Code § 3727 - Assignments of claims

In subsection (a)(1), the words “or share thereof” and “whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor” are omitted as surplus. In clause (2), the word “authorization” is substituted for “powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities” to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsections (b) and (c), the word “official” is substituted for “officer” for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code.

In subsection (b), the words “Except as hereinafter provided” are omitted as unnecessary. The words “read and” are omitted as surplus. The words “to the person acknowledging the same” are omitted as unnecessary. The text of 31:203(1st par. last sentence) is omitted as superseded by 39:410. The words “Notwithstanding any law to the contrary governing the validity of assignments ” and the text of 31:203(last par.) are omitted as unnecessary.

In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “bank, trust company, or other . . . including any Federal lending agency” are omitted as surplus. The words “of money due or to become due under a contract providing for payments totaling at least $1,000” are substituted for “in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United States or from any agency or department thereof, under a contract providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or more” to eliminate unnecessary words. The text of 31:203(2d par. proviso cl. 1) is omitted as executed. In clause (1), the words “in the case of any contract entered into after October 9, 1940 ” are omitted as executed. In clause (2)(A), the words “payable under such contract” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3), the words “true” and “instrument of” are omitted as surplus. The words “department or” are omitted because of the restatement. The words “if any” and “to make payment” are omitted as surplus.

In subsection (d), before clause (1), the words “During a war or national emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by law and ended by proclamation or law” are substituted for “in time of war or national emergency proclaimed by the President (including the national emergency proclaimed December 16, 1950 ) or by Act or joint resolution of the Congress and until such war or national emergency has been terminated in such manner” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “ Department of Energy (when carrying out duties and powers formerly carried out by the Atomic Energy Commission)” are substituted for “Atomic Energy Commission” (which was reconstituted as the Energy Research and Development Administration by 42:5813 and 5814) because of 42:7151(a) and 7293. The words “other department or . . . of the United States . . . except any such contract under which full payment has been made” and “of any moneys due or to become due under such contract” before “shall not be subject” are omitted as surplus. The words “A payment subsequently due under the contract (even after the war or emergency is ended) shall be paid to the assignee without” are substituted for “and if such provision or one to the same general effect has been at any time heretofore or is hereafter included or inserted in any such contract, payments to be made thereafter to an assignee of any moneys due or to become due under such contract, whether during or after such war or emergency . . . hereafter” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “of any nature” are omitted as surplus. In clause (1), the words “or any department or agency thereof” are omitted as unnecessary. In clause (2), the words “under any renegotiation statute or under any statutory renegotiation article in the contract” are omitted as surplus.

Subsection (e)(1) is substituted for 31:203(4th par.) to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsection (e)(2), the words “person receiving an amount under an assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignees, transferees, or allottees” for clarity and consistency. The words “or to others for them” and “with respect to such assignments , transfers, or allotments or the use of such moneys” are omitted as surplus. The words “person making the assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignors, transferors, or allotters” for clarity and consistency.

Contract Assignment Agreement

Select the name of the state whose law will govern the interpretation of this contract and will be the location of any future disputes related to this contract. This is usually the state where at least one of the Parties resides or does business related to the contract. If this Agreement involves the transfer of land, this would be the state where the land is located.

CONTRACT ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT

State of Alabama

This Assigment Agreement (the "Agreement) is entered into by and between ________ (the "Assignor"), having their principal address located at ________ , and ________ (the "Assignee"), having their principal address located at ________ , both of whom agree to be bound by this Agreement, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained and other good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, witnesseth:

WHEREAS , Assignor entered into a Contract, included as an attachment to this Agreement, with ________ (the "Obligor"), referred to hereinafter as "Contract with ________ ";

WHEREAS , the Contract with ________ has an original expiration date of ________ as may be extended as permitted therein;

WHEREAS , Assignor wishes to assign all of their rights and obligations under the Contract with ________ to Assignee; and

WHEREAS , the necessary verbal consent was obtained from the Obligor on ________ ;

NOW THEREFORE , Assignor and Assignee agree to the following:

I. Assignor and Assignee hereby agree that the Assignor shall assign all their rights, titles, and interests, and delegate all of their obligations, responsibilities, and duties, in ad to the Contract with ________ , to Assignee.

II. Assignee hereby accepts the assignment of all of Assignors obligations, responsibilities, and duties under the Contract and all of Assignors rights, titles, and interests in and to the Contract with ________ .

III. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Assignor agrees to defend and indemnify the Obligor from any and all claims,actions, judgments, liabilities, proceedings, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of defense and damages, resulting from Assignors performance prior to the assignment of the contract and resulting from Assignees performance after the assignment of the Contract with ________ , provided, however, that after the assignment of the Contract with ________ , the State shall first look to Assignee to satisfy all claims, actions, judgments, liabilities, proceedings, and costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and ot her costs of defense and damages resulting from Assignee's performance.

IV. Assignee agrees to indemnify the Obligor from any and all claims, actions, judgments, liabilities, proceedings, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and other costs of defense and damages, resulting from Assignee's performance after the assignment of the Contract with ________ .

V. No modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and agreed upon by all relevant Parties.

VI. 52 252 28222 522 252888822 22 2588 825222222 88 5285 22 8285885, 8882258, 25 5222225825882 225 522 525822, 2522 252 2552828 52522 2552 8585 252888822 85588 82 522225 22 82 825582 525 252 522582525 22 252 825222222 85588 82 22225825 58 82 252 825582 252888822 8252 22825 82885525 82 252 825222222.

VII. This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Alabama and both Parties expressly consent to jurisdiction in such courts.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties execute the Agreement as follows:

______________________________________________ ________

______________________________________________ Date

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When Assigning the Right to Pursue Relief, Always Remember to Assign Title to, Or Ownership in, The Claim

• Posted on: Oct 4 2016

Whether a party has standing to bring a lawsuit is often considered through the constitutional lens of justiciability – that is, whether there is a “case or controversy” between the plaintiff and the defendant “within the meaning of Art. III.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To have Article III standing, “the plaintiff [must have] ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant [its] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on [its] behalf.” Id. at 498–99 (quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

To show a personal stake in the litigation, the plaintiff must establish three things: First, he/she has sustained an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the injury has to be caused in some way by the defendant’s action or omission. Id . Finally, a favorable resolution of the case is “likely” to redress the injury. Id . at 561.

When a person or entity receives an assignment of claims, the question becomes whether he/she can show a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e. , a case and controversy “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008) (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2000)).

To assign a claim effectively, the claim’s owner “must manifest an intention to make the assignee the owner of the claim.” Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc. , 106 F.3d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A would-be assignor need not use any particular language to validly assign its claim “so long as the language manifests [the assignor’s] intention to transfer at least title or ownership , i.e., to accomplish ‘a completed transfer of the entire interest of the assignor in the particular subject of assignment.’” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). An assignor’s grant of, for example, “‘the power to commence and prosecute to final consummation or compromise any suits, actions or proceedings,’” id. at 18 (quoting agreements that were the subject of that appeal), may validly create a power of attorney, but that language would not validly assign a claim, because it does “not purport to transfer title or ownership” of one. Id.

On September 15, 2016, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, issued a decision addressing the foregoing principles holding that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims because the assignment of the right to pursue remedies did not constitute the assignment of claims.  Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 2016 NY Slip Op. 06051.

BACKGROUND :

Cortlandt involved four related actions in which the plaintiffs – Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. (“Cortlandt”), an assignee for collection, and Wilmington Trust Co. (“WTC”), an indenture trustee – sought payment of the principal and interest on notes issued in public offerings. Each action alleged that Hellas Telecommunications, S.a.r.l. and its affiliated entities, the issuer and guarantor of the notes, transferred the proceeds of the notes by means of fraudulent conveyances to two private equity firms, Apax Partners, LLP/TPG Capital, L.P. – the other defendants named in the actions.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions on numerous grounds, including that Cortlandt, as the assignee for collection, lacked standing to pursue the actions. To cure the claimed standing defect, Cortlandt and WTC moved to amend the complaints to add SPQR Capital (Cayman) Ltd. (“SPQR”), the assignor of note interests to Cortlandt, as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia , SPQR entered into an addendum to the assignment with Cortlandt pursuant to which Cortlandt received “all right, title, and interest” in the notes.

The Motion Court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that, among other things, Cortlandt lacked standing to maintain the actions and that, although the standing defect was not jurisdictional and could be cured, the plaintiffs failed to cure the defect in the proposed amended complaint. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 47 Misc. 3d 544 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2014).

The Motion Court’s Ruling

As an initial matter, the Motion Court cited to the reasoning of the court in Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch , No. 12 Civ. 9351 (JPO), 2013 WL 3762882, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (the “SDNY Action”), a related action that was dismissed on standing grounds.  The complaint in the SDNY Action, like the complaints before the Motion Court, alleged that Cortlandt was the assignee of the notes with a “right to collect” the principal and interest due on the notes. As evidence of these rights, Cortlandt produced an assignment, similar to the ones in the New York Supreme Court actions, which provided that as the assignee with the right to collect, Cortlandt could collect the principal and interest due on the notes and pursue all remedies with respect thereto. In dismissing the SDNY Action, Judge Oetken found that the complaint did not allege, and the assignment did not provide, that “title to or ownership of the claims has been assigned to Cortlandt.” 2013 WL 3762882, at *2, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741, at *7. The court also found that the grant of a power of attorney (that is, the power to sue on and collect on a claim) was “not the equivalent of an assignment of ownership” of a claim. 2013 WL 3762882 at *1, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 at *5. Consequently, because the assignment did not transfer title or ownership of the claim to Cortlandt, there was no case or controversy for the court to decide ( i.e. , Cortlandt could not prove that it had an interest in the outcome of the litigation).

The Motion Court “concur[red] with” Judge Oeken’s decision, holding that “the assignments to Cortlandt … were assignments of a right of collection, not of title to the claims, and are accordingly insufficient as a matter of law to confer standing upon Cortlandt.”  In so holding, the Motion Court observed that although New York does not have an analogue to Article III, it is nevertheless analogous in its requirement that a plaintiff have a stake in the outcome of the litigation:

New York does not have an analogue to article III. However, the New York standards for standing are analogous, as New York requires “[t]he existence of an injury in fact—an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated.”

Under long-standing New York law, an assignee is the “real party in interest” where the “title to the specific claim” is passed to the assignee, even if the assignee may ultimately be liable to another for the amounts collected.

Citations omitted.

Based upon the foregoing, the Motion Court found that Cortlandt lacked standing to pursue the actions.

Cortlandt appealed the dismissal. With regard to the Motion Court’s dismissal of Cortlandt on standing grounds, the First Department affirmed the Motion Court’s ruling, holding:

The [IAS] court correctly found that plaintiff Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. lacks standing to bring the claims in Index Nos. 651693/10 and 653357/11 because, while the assignments to Cortlandt for the PIK notes granted it “full rights to collect amounts of principal and interest due on the Notes, and to pursue all remedies,” they did not transfer “title or ownership” of the claims.

The Takeaway

Cortlandt limits the ability of an assignee to pursue a lawsuit when the assignee has no direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. By requiring an assignee to have legal title to, or an ownership interest in, the claim, the Court made clear that only a valid assignment of a claim will suffice to fulfill the injury-in-fact requirement. Cortlandt also makes clear that a power of attorney permitting another to conduct litigation on behalf of others as their attorney-in-fact is not a valid assignment and does not confer a legal title to the claims it brings. Therefore, as the title of this article warns: when assigning the right to pursue relief, always remember to assign title to, or ownership in, the claim.

Tagged with: Business Law

Assignment of Claim after a Loss: What Homeowners Should Know

Let’s start with the basics. If you, as a homeowner, sustain property damage or losses because of a covered event (like a fire, for example), you will need your home repaired. You choose a contractor or restoration company to do the work – but the check from the insurance company has not come through yet, and you need them to start right away. So, what can you do?

You can sign an “assignment of claim,” which assigns your rights (as the policyholder) to benefits and proceeds from the loss, to the company or contractors. In the simplest of terms, the assignment of claim allows your contractor to get paid directly from the insurance company.

What is the anti-transfer clause in insurance?

However, many contractors and purchasers of the damaged property have found themselves in a tight spot over the years, because of something called the anti-transfer clause. As explained on the Tennessee Insurance Litigation Blog ,  the anti-transfer clause usually reads something like this: “Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without our written consent except in the case of death of an individual named insured.” Sometimes, the insurance company requires written consent before an assignment of claim can be made.

This clause routinely allows insurers to deny payments to contractors – but it shouldn’t, when an assignment of claim is made post-loss.

What’s the difference between pre-loss vs. post-loss assignments?

The Courts of Tennessee have routinely ruled on behalf of contractors and purchasers who were assigned the claim after the loss occurred. That is because the original assignee – the homeowner – was approved by the insurance company in the first place, and because the damage occurred regardless. There was no additional risk for the insurance company. Therefore, even if the contractor has a long and storied history of rule-breaking (or even criminal activity), the homeowner can assign the claim however he or she chooses; after all, the loss already happened.

Where insurance companies can (and do) have a leg up is for pre-loss assignments. The insurance company underwrote the risk on Bob and Jane Homeowner because it felt confident enough to do so. Bob and Jane cannot assign their policy to another person without the approval of the insurer, even when no loss has occurred.

Even if there is an anti-transfer clause in your policy, the chances are very good that a post-loss assignment cannot be legally denied by your insurer. If it is, seek out an experienced insurance dispute lawyer to help you argue the denial.

One last note for Tennessee policyholders

In some cases, the insurance company may decide that the amount of your loss is worth less than the cost of the renovations for which the contractor is charging. If this happens, you could be on the hook for the remainder of the costs, depending, of course, on the language of the deal with your contractor.

Because of this risk, it’s wise to contact an attorney before making any decisions. Get informed about your rights from the start, and let your lawyer address any potential hiccups along the way. If your insurer lowballs your claim, your attorney can  handle the dispute , to ensure that you are compensated fairly.

At McWherter Scott & Bobbitt, we have spent years fighting against unfair insurance claims policies in Tennessee and Mississippi. Let  Brandon McWherter ,  Jonathan Bobbitt  and  Clint Scott   put their knowledge and experience to work for you. Please call  731-664-1340 or fill out our  contact form . We maintain offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson and Knoxville.

Brandon McWherter has dedicated his practice to assisting insurance policyholders with their claims against insurance companies, including claims for bad faith. He is licensed in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Learn More

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